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ABSTRACT
Some scholarship and political experts describe voter ID laws as a form of voter
suppression because they make it harder for certain groups of people to vote. First, this thesis
considers the historical backdrop of voter discrimination resulting in the passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, and subsequent state uses of registration and voter ID laws. Then, this study
reviews the theoretical foundation of freedom of expression as developed by Thomas Emerson and
individual and social free expression values, including the social value of self-governance
explicated by Alexander Meiklejohn. Some scholars also suggest that voter ID laws may be more
closely scrutinized by courts if challenged under explicit provisions of state constitutions that grant
voters a fundamental right to vote. This thesis begins its analysis by examining state voter ID laws
that the National Council of State Legislatures identified in effect in 2018. Next, the study reviews
how courts analyzed voter ID laws since the U.S. Supreme Court’s approval of a strict ID law in
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board in 2008. Overall, this thesis found only a few examples
where courts used First Amendment rationales and any associated free expression values when
addressing ID laws. More commonly, courts applied the Burdick balancing test as prescribed by
Crawford to uphold the law using two common rationales, either the plaintiff did not meet their
burden of proving a significant burden on voters or the state’s interest of preventing fraud
outweighed any burden on voting rights. Finally, this thesis recommends that all courts review
voter ID laws under a strict scrutiny analysis with the state having the burden of proof and demand
that states justify why certain types of photo IDs are deemed unacceptable.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court described the right to vote as “a fundamental political
right” in its 1972 decision, Dunn v. Blumstein.1 Voting allows citizens to choose leaders, policy
positions, and to influence democracy.2 Representatives may ignore citizens who cannot or do
not vote.3 Voter identification laws have been contentious since 1950 when South Carolina first
required some form of identification at the polls.4 Within the past decade, however, stricter forms
of voter identification requirements have surfaced.5
Some scholarship and political experts describe voter identification laws as forms of
voter suppression because they make it harder for certain groups of people to vote.6 In fact,
political scientists Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi, and Lindsay Neilson found in a 2017 study
that strict identification laws have a negative impact on turnout of racial and ethnic minorities in
both primary and general elections.7 Also, the group found that these laws tend to “skew
democracy toward those on the political right.”8
Voter identification laws are one of the many reasons Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton
raised as to why she lost the 2016 Presidential Election in What Happened.9 For example, in
Wisconsin, where Secretary Clinton only lost the state by about 22,000 votes, she cites a
Priorities USA study to estimate that a new voter ID law helped reduce turnout by 200,000

Armand Derfner & J. Gerald Hebert, Voting is Speech, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 471, 471-72 (2015). See Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
2
Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi, & Lindsay Nielson, Voter identification laws and the suppression of minority
votes. 79 J. POL. 363, 363 (2017).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, WHAT HAPPENED 420 (Simon & Schuster, 1st ed. 2017).
1

1

votes.10 Wisconsin was vital for Clinton’s projected path to victory because Democrats had won
the state in every presidential election since 1992.11 A Republican representative from Wisconsin
predicted before the election that the new law would help President Donald Trump “pull off an
upset in the state.”12
Clinton elaborated that the Associated Press documented subsequent voter denials due to
the voter ID law: a Navy veteran with an out-of-state driver’s license, a college student using a
college ID that lacked an expiration date, and a senior woman with chronic lung disease who had
merely lost her license.13 Conversely, in Illinois, where the state instituted measures to make
voting more accessible, turnout was up more than five percent.14 Clinton states that turnout,
especially among African-Americans, was 14 points higher in Illinois than Wisconsin.15
American historian, Alexander Keyssar, noted that leading up to the 2008 Presidential
Election, Republicans pressed state legislatures to pass legislation that required all prospective
voters to present government-issued photo identifications when they showed up at polls.16
Existing identification requirements varied from state to state, so Republicans argued that this
state of affairs was an invitation for voter fraud.17 According to opinion polls, the idea has
popular support.18 In an age where you need identification to board an airplane or enter an office
building, many people feel that it is not unreasonable to impose similar safeguards at the ballot
box.19 Also, photo identification requirements would restore “integrity” of American elections

10

Id.
Id. at 384.
12
Id. at 420.
13
Id. at 421.
14
Id. at 420.
15
Id.
16
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 283
(Basic Books, 2nd ed. 2009).
17
Id. at 283-84.
18
Id. at 284.
19
Id.
11

2

among “legitimate” voters who worried about the possibility of fraud, especially in the wake of
the 2000 Presidential election debacle in Florida.20 For the first time since 1888, the candidate
winning the highest number of popular votes, Democrat Al Gore, was not the candidate who won
the Presidency in the Electoral College vote, Republican George W. Bush.21
The Washington Post, however, found only four documented cases of voter fraud out of
the 136 million votes cast in the 2016 election.22 In fact, one example included an Iowa woman
who voted twice for Trump.23 Trump’s lawyers even said in a Michigan court, “All available
evidence suggests that the 2016 general election was not tainted by fraud or mistake.”24
Nonetheless, a problem lies in identification laws that suppress specific segments of the
electorate, namely low-income and African American voters.25 A Brennan Center study of voter
identification laws instituted since 2010 indicates that voter restriction laws vary by state.26 The
website categorizes the restrictions to voting to include making it harder to register to vote,
cutting back on early voting hours and days, and making it more challenging to restore voting
rights to persons convicted of felonies.27 In 2016, fourteen states had these various types of new
voting restrictions in place for the first time, including Wisconsin.28
Although Louisiana did not impose any new voter restrictions for the 2016 Presidential
Election, Louisiana has a unique history of voter suppression attempts.29 When Senator John

20

Id.
Id.
22
Clinton, supra note 9, at 420.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
New Voting Restrictions in Place for 2016 Presidential Election, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
http://www.brennancenter.org/new-voting-restrictions-2010-election (last visited November 21, 2017).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
ELECTION 1986: THE BREAUX/MOORE DEBATE, LPB Digital Collection,
http://ladigitalmedia.org/video_v2/asset-detail/LSEND-19861019 (last visited November 21, 2017).
21
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Breaux first campaigned for the U.S. Senate in 1986, sources linked Breaux’s opponent,
Republican Congressman W. Henson Moore, III, to a group accused of purging names from
voter rolls in rural areas.30 The purge’s target was African-American voters, but prominent
members of the Long family were also purged and called attention to the issue.31 Although
Louisiana has a tainted record of voter suppression attempts, modern Louisiana law could also
serve as a model for implementing a viable alternative to restrictive voter ID laws.32 When a
voter is unable to present identification to vote, then the voter could sign an affidavit instead.33
Through an in-depth examination of published federal appellate court and U.S. Supreme
Court cases, this thesis analyzes how courts, if at all, deal with voter identification laws under the
First Amendment because literature indicates the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in how it
has analyzed First Amendment challenges to voting laws. In addition, this thesis examines what
First Amendment values, if any, courts are identifying relating to voting. In doing so, this thesis
considers the historical backdrop of voter discrimination before states passed identification laws,
especially for veterans, students, senior citizens, females, persons with disabilities, and
minorities.

30

Id.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Keyssar, supra note 16, at 283.
31
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
The United States does have something very close to “universal suffrage,” where all adult
citizens have the right to vote, with recent exceptions made for convicted felons.34 Voting
discrimination, however, dates back to the American Revolution, arising out of fear of
interference with local issues or overwhelmingly favoring one political party.35 African
Americans and women historically struggled for the right to vote in the United States. These two
groups successfully secured the right to vote through Constitutional amendments XV in 1870
and XIX in 1920.
While many still consider the Voting Rights Act of 1965 one of the most far-reaching
pieces of civil rights legislation in U.S. history, its noble intent of enforcing the provisions of the
Fifteenth Amendment and removing local barriers that prevented African Americans from voting
was not without unintended consequences. This chapter reviews the Voting Rights Act, states’
uses of registration and voter identification laws, and then the Supreme Court’s approval of a
strict, voter identification law in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board in 2008.
The Voting Rights Act
The South was a “cauldron of racial tension” in the 1950s.36 In Louisiana, for example,
members of the White Citizens Council purged black registrants from voting lists for minor
paperwork irregularities.37 Also, a 1960 state law allowed disenfranchisement for people of “bad
character,” which included anyone participating in a sit-in.38 President Dwight Eisenhower,
however, proceeded cautiously in his first term favoring a more limited federal government. 39

34

Id. at xvi-xx.
Id. at 9.
36
Id. at 206.
37
Id. at 207.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 208.
35

5

The 1956 murder of two Mississippi voting rights workers, however, spurred the President and
Congress into action. 40
As the first civil rights bill passed by Congress in 80 years, the Civil Rights Act of 1957
was modest.41 The Act primarily promoted the voting rights agenda through the creation of the
Commission on Civil Rights.42 The commission recommended the appointment of federal
registrars to be dispatched to the South and given the authority to register voters.43 The
commission also lent its power to call for broader national measures after concluding that the
reliance on county-by-county litigation was “time consuming, expensive, and difficult” to bring
an end to discriminatory voting practices.44
Although then President John Kennedy owed his narrow electoral victory to the black
vote, he lacked a strong popular mandate and had limited influence in Congress to advocate for a
civil rights bill based on the commission’s recommendations.45 His successor, Lyndon Johnson,
however, seized the moment of national unity after Kennedy’s assassination to obtain the civil
rights bill’s passage as a tribute to the late president.46 As the first President to officially align
himself with the Civil Rights Movement, Johnson noted in a joint session of Congress that “it is
really all of us, who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice. And we shall
overcome.”47

40

Id.
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 209.
44
Id. at 209-10.
45
Id. at 210. Kennedy beat Republican Richard Nixon by only 0.2 percent of the popular vote in 1960. Some alleged
that fraud in Texas and Illinois cost Nixon the election. In response, Republicans organized an intricate antifraud
campaign titled “Operation Eagle Eye.” Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 638 (2007).
46
Keyssar, supra note 16, at 210.
47
Id. at 211.
41
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After successfully being elected as President in his own right in 1964, Johnson signed the
historic Voting Rights Act of 1965 that contained critical elements demanded by activists and the
Commission on Civil Rights.48 First, the Act immediately suspended literacy tests and good
character voting requirements for five years.49 Second, the law gave the Attorney General
authority to send federal examiners to the South to enroll voters.50 Also, to prevent future
discriminatory requirements, section 5 of the act prohibited the state governments,
predominantly in the South, from changing voting laws without first obtaining federal
“preclearance.”51 Finally, the Act contained a congressional finding that poll taxes in state
elections abridged the right to vote, and authorized the Justice Department to initiate litigation to
challenge their constitutionality.52
The Voting Rights Act was a milestone in American political history.53 Interestingly, the
essence of the act enforced the Fifteenth Amendment, which had been the law for almost a
century.54 Congress renewed the Voting Rights Act in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006.55 Shortly
after President George W. Bush signed the 2006 Voting Rights Act, a Texas utility district
challenged section 5 in court after being denied a “bail out” from federal pre-clearance.56
The utility district argued that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority with the
pre-clearance requirement.57 Also, the district alleged that since racial discrimination was no
longer a problem in modern society, the Voting Rights Act had achieved its objectives and pre-

48

Id. at 210-11.
Id. at 211.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 212.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 212-14.
56
Id. at 215. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 2 (2013).
57
Keyssar, supra note 16, at 215.
49
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clearance requirements had become burdensome.58 Ultimately, in 2013, the Supreme Court
agreed with the utility district in Shelby County v. Holder and held section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 unconstitutional.59 In a divided 5-4 decision, the Court found that the formula
impermissibly burdened the principles of federalism and was no longer responsive to the needs
of society.60
Voter Identification Laws
Although little evidence supports the problem of voter fraud, at best, Republicans pressed
state legislatures to pass legislation that required all prospective voters to present governmentissued photo IDs in years leading up to the 2008 Presidential election.61 Existing identification
requirements varied from state to state, and Republicans alleged that this was an invitation for
voter fraud.62 Representatives claimed that government-issued IDs could prevent such fraudulent
crimes.63 Also, new photo-ID laws would restore confidence in elections among “legitimate”
voters who worried about the possibility of fraud, in the wake of the 2000 election debacle in
Florida.64 Various states tightened ID requirements, including Arizona, Georgia, and Indiana.65
As of 2007, no empirical study at either the national or state level had measured the
magnitude of voter fraud.66 Photo-identification advocates have relied on two categories of
assertions in support of ID laws, including anecdotal examples of voter fraud and analogies to

58

Id. at 213-15.
Id. at 215. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 2 (2013).
60
Keyssar, supra note 16, at 215. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 2 (2013).
61
Keyssar, supra note 16, at 283.
62
Id. at 283-84.
63
Id. at 284.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 285.
66
Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 635 (2007).
59
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other contexts that require photo identification.67 George Washington University Professor of
Law Spencer Overton pointed out flaws in both arguments.68
First, anecdotal evidence has been heavily discounted in most fields because such
evidence permits only a loose inference about matters a field is trying to study.69 In other words,
anecdotes can mislead people to generalize rules based on examples that the anecdotes cannot
teach.70 For example, Republicans cited anecdotal evidence of voter fraud to explain John
Kerry’s massive Wisconsin win in the 2004 Presidential election.71 Of the nine allegations of
“double-voting” that occurred in the state, a Republican-appointed U.S. attorney failed to indict
any of these individuals on fraud charges.72 These examples are misleading because six of the
cases involved clerical errors, and the other three involved individuals with similar names and
different birth dates.73
Second, voting identification requirements have often been compared to presenting an
identification to board an airplane, enter federal buildings, or buy alcohol.74 While analogies are
common rhetorical tools, analogies have limitations.75 Overton pointed out that the relevant
question should be whether voting resembles these other activities sufficiently to warrant
identical treatment.76 In contrast to voting in elections, airline passengers do not cast votes that
are totaled to assess the will of the entire airplane and to govern the journey.77 Similarly, liquor

67

Id. at 644.
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 645.
71
Id. at 645. Another anecdotal example used by Ronald Reagan for years, even after being informed of the true
story, is the alleged “welfare queen” he used to discredit the welfare system. Reagan claimed she used 80 different
names and a dozen Social Security cards to defraud the government of over $150,000. In reality, this woman used
two aliases to recover $8,000. Id. at 645.
72
Overton, supra note 66, at 646.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 650.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 651.
77
Id.
68
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stores lack incentives to exclude legitimate consumers, while some politicians benefit from
reducing turnout of specific demographic populations likely to vote against them.78
Best available data suggests an estimated six to eleven percent of voting-age Americans
lack a state-issued photo ID, especially in states like Wisconsin, where seventy-eight percent of
black men ages 18-24 lack a driver’s license.79 Without hard data, policymakers could
misperceive the risk of voter fraud.80 Empirical data would also indicate whether such laws
would disproportionately exclude certain groups, such as senior citizens, the poor, individuals
with disabilities, and people of color. 81
The Democratic Party resisted the new ID requirements that could disenfranchise as
many as nineteen million potential voters who did not or could not possess a valid driver’s
license or passport.82 Even if states created ways for individuals to obtain photo IDs, these paths
would be inherently burdensome on the underprivileged and potentially cost prohibitive.83 In
sum, new ID requirements potentially could lead to voter suppression that disproportionately
impacted the young, elderly, poor, and African Americans, all of whom are more likely to vote
Democratic.84 These laws were challenged in courts on various grounds, including violating state
and federal constitutional provisions and the Voting Rights Act.85 Challengers argued that photo
ID laws have placed an undue burden on the right to vote and have amounted to an extra-

78

Id.
Id. at 635.
80
Id. at 652.
81
Id. at 653.
82
Keyssar, supra note 16, at 284.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 285.
79
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constitutional franchise requirement.86 They also argued that voter ID laws disparately have
prohibited low-income voters and voters of color from gaining access to the polls.87
In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a challenge to one of the strictest photo ID laws in
the nation in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.88 The Indiana law at issue required
voters to present an unexpired government-issued photo ID to vote, and provisional ballots
would only count if the voter reported to the county clerk’s office within ten days of the election
to present their required identification.89 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
concluded that few prospective voters would be burdened by the law, while acknowledging there
had been no recent cited instances of voter impersonation.90
A divided Supreme Court upheld the law as well.91 In his plurality opinion, Justice
Stevens found the “risk of voter fraud” to be “real.”92 Reaching back to 1868 for examples, he
wrote, “Flagrant examples of such fraud in other parts of the country have been documented
throughout this Nation's history by respected historians and journalists.”93 Based on this
evidence, Justice Stevens concluded there was no question regarding the importance of the
state’s interest in preventing voter fraud.94 He asserted that “inconvenience” for voters lacking
requisite identification was merely gathering documents and traveling to a motor vehicle office,
which did not amount to an unduly burdensome requirement.95 Justice Scalia concurred in the

86

Id.
Id.
88
Id. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
89
Keyssar, supra note 16, at 285.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 195 n. 11. Stevens quoted in a footnote an infamous New York City election influenced by
a political machine. “Big Tim” Sullivan, a New York state senator and U.S. congressman, insisted that the voters
who were paid to vote multiple times have “whiskers,” which could be trimmed multiple times to have multiple
appearances. Id.
94
Keyssar, supra note 16, at 285.
95
Id.
87
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judgment only.96 Fearing a floodgate of litigation, he added that the Supreme Court should not
get involved in local election law.97
In his dissent, Justice Souter insisted that the burden Justice Stevens referred to would be
“an unreasonable and irrelevant burden on voters who are poor and old.”98 Also, in the absence
of no recent recorded voter impersonation cases, Souter indicated there is no demonstrable need
for the strict law.99 In a separate dissent, while Justice Breyer approved of voter ID laws in
general, he found Indiana’s to be unduly burdensome for low-income and elderly voters.100
The U.S. Supreme Court’s election law docket was unusually diverse in 2008, including
cases involving campaign finance, voter identification, the Voting Rights Act, and regulation of
political parties.101 Overall, the Roberts Court’s treatment of theses cases showed more restraint
than was exercised by their predecessors in their treatment of election laws, except for the
Court’s intense review of campaign finance reforms.102 Although this docket gave the Court
ample opportunity to shift the direction of election law jurisprudence toward promoting
competition, the Court opinions stuck with traditional approaches, such as balancing state
interests against the right to vote, and avoided asking whether the laws represented a means of
entrenching incumbent parties.103
After Crawford, Republicans across the nation began to press for passage of new photoidentification laws modeled after Indiana’s.104 Exactly how many Indiana residents would be

96

Id.
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, A., concurring).
98
Id. at 237.
99
Keyssar, supra note 16, at 286.
100
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 237-39 (Breyer, S., dissenting).
101
Nathaniel Persily, Fig Leaves and Tea Leaves in the Supreme Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 2008 SUP.
CT. REV. 89, 89-90 (2008).
102
Id. at 93.
103
Id. at 94.
104
Keyssar, supra note 16, at 286.
97
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prevented from voting by the new ID law remained unclear, but within weeks of the decision,
several senior-aged, Indiana nuns were prevented from voting in a primary because they lacked
the required photo ID.105 Also, in the 2008 Presidential election, the most visible impact of the
ID law was on out-of-state college students who tried to register to vote in cities where they were
studying, but lacked requisite Indiana IDs.106 As in other periods of history, the combination of
partisan interests, class apprehension, and a desire to win elections were all causes for narrowing
the franchise.107 In addition, a deeply ingrained stereotypical belief existed that poor people,
African Americans, and immigrants may be more vulnerable to persuasive politicians, interest
groups, or employers who offered monetary incentives in exchange for members of these groups
to vote a certain way.108
A Constitutional Right to Vote
In 2001, Congressman Jesse Jackson proposed a Constitutional amendment for an
“affirmative” right to vote for all citizens.109 Advocates for the change strongly believed that
shoring up a Constitutional amendment could help prevent the legal chaos similar to that caused
by Bush v. Gore in 2000 and even prevent future election hijacking if a state legislature decided
to ignore the popular votes.110 The amendment, however, failed to gain support for various
reasons.111 Some argued the change is not necessary because there is already an implicit right to
vote in the Constitution.112 Others wanted to avoid a Constitutional amendment altogether to

105

Id.
Id.
107
Id. at 286-87.
108
Id. at 287.
109
Id. at 291.
110
Id. at 292. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (Democratic candidate, Al Gore, filed a complaint contesting the
certification of Florida’s state results in te 2000 Presidential election. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the manual
recounts ordered by Florida Supreme Court, without objective standards for discerning a voter’s intent constituted
an arbitrary treatment of voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.).
111
Keyssar, supra note 16, at 292.
112
Id.
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dodge also addressing other initiatives, such as a ban on same-sex marriage.113 Finally, others
feared this change could jeopardize renewal of the Voting Rights Act.114
In the 2000 Presidential election, law professor Jamin Raskin wrote that a majority of
Americans learned that the U.S. Constitution has allowed state legislatures to disregard the
people’s votes in Presidential elections.115 State legislatures have “plenary” power to “appoint, in
such Manners as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors.”116 Keyssar compared
this underlying Constitutional fact to “a half-forgotten corpse” that “had suddenly been jarred
loose from the river bottom and floated upward into view.”117
Additional stark inequities exist in the current franchise structure, including about
571,000 taxpaying, draftable U.S. citizens who live in the District of Columbia (D.C.), but lack
any direct voting representation in Congress.118 Lacking Congressional representation is a double
injustice to D.C. residents since Congress acts as both their national and local legislative body.119
Similarly, about four million American citizens are living in the federal territories of Puerto
Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.120 While Congress allows these
citizens to vote for President, they lack representation in the Electoral College.121 Like D.C.
residents, residents of the territories lack any direct representation in Congress other than a nonvoting delegate in the House of Representatives.122

113

Id.
Id.
115
Jamin Raskin, A Right-to-Vote Amendment for the US Constitution: Confronting America’s Structural
Democracy Deficit, 3 ELECTION L.J. 559 (2004).
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U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 2.
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Raskin, supra note 115, at 561.
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Id. at 564.
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U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 17.
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Raskin, supra note 115, at 565.
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Id. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3, cl. 2.
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Raskin, supra note 115, at 565.
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Other unresolved issues to be answered by the drafters of the constitutional “right-tovote” amendment include whether to enfranchise convicted felons, and if so, when to do so, and
lowering the voting age to 17 to allow millions of high school graduates to vote.123 Ironically, the
United States was the first nation conceived as a democratic response against tyranny, while also
being the only nation on earth that disenfranchises its capital city residents.124 In the absence of a
voting amendment, the next section analyzes whether scholarship or Supreme Court opinions
have recognized a constitutional right to vote contained within the First Amendment.
State Constitutional Claims
Derfner and Hebert explained that often the level of judicial scrutiny in voting rights
cases could be outcome determinative.125 The researchers cited a 2012 state appellate decision,
Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, where it took two attempts and a directive from
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to strike down the state’s ID law as an unconstitutional burden
on voters’ fundamental right to vote explicitly provided in the state’s constitution.126 On the first
review, the Applewhite court did not apply strict scrutiny, but indicated it might have reached a
different result if it had.127 After a full trial on remand, the court did apply strict scrutiny with the
government required to show a compelling state interest for the law and that the narrow tailoring
of the law to meet that interest, which the state did not, and the court struck down the law.128
How Is Voting Protected under the First Amendment?
The U.S. Supreme Court has strictly scrutinized campaign spending to influence voters
in elections by candidates, political parties, or even corporations as it would any other speech
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Id. at 567.
Id. at 572.
125
Derfner & Hebert, supra note 1, at 477
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Id. at 478 (citing Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 330 MD 2012 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012)).
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Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 2012 WL 3332376 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012).
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regulations under the First Amendment.129 Scholars, however, have written that the Court began
giving a “short shrift” to burdens on the right to vote and voter registration in 1972 when the
U.S. Supreme Court addressed Dunn v. Blumstein.130 In Voting is Speech, Armand Derfner and J.
Gerald Hebert, both civil rights attorneys, stated that voter identification laws pick and choose
which types of identification are acceptable, and in doing so, pick and choose which types of
voters are acceptable.131 Over time, courts have applied differing levels of judicial scrutiny when
addressing voting rights as First Amendment rights.132
Texas enacted the most illustrative law on this issue in 2011, and that voter identification
law was subsequently mired in litigation in the Veasey v. Abbott line of cases.133 The law
disenfranchised more than 600,000 voters unless they obtained a “qualifying ID,” which is more
onerous and expensive than registering to vote.134 The law deemed concealed handgun permits
and military IDs as acceptable, which are common forms of identification for white voters.135
Meanwhile, student IDs and civilian government employee IDs were excluded and more
commonly possessed by African American and Hispanic voters.136 In 2017, the U.S. Supreme
Court did not hear an appeal of the case; Chief Justice John Roberts concluded the issues would
be better suited for review at a later time.137
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Dating back to the 1960s, laws that placed “severe” restrictions, such as property
ownership, literacy tests, or poll taxes, on the right to vote, were subject to strict scrutiny by the
Court.138 For instance, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections involved a poll tax that directly
restricted some citizens’ right to vote.139 In that 1966 opinion, the Supreme Court identified the
right to vote as a “fundamental right” and struck down the law under a strict scrutiny analysis.140
The burden of proof under strict scrutiny falls on the government to show a compelling state
interest and that the restriction is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.141 Often under strict
scrutiny, when the government is unable to show a compelling interest, so the Court overturns
the restriction.142
The arrival of four new justices turned voting rights cases in a different direction in a
series of cases starting in 1973.143 In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the
majority opinion indicated it has a long history of providing “zealous protection” against
government interference with “the individual’s rights to speak and vote” and addressed a nexus
between education and voting rights when addressing the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause.144 “Yet we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority
to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice,”145
according to the Court. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall wrote, however, that such
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important interests underlie the right to vote that the court previously applied strict scrutiny
analysis to discriminatory state treatment regarding voting.146 Derfner and Hebert explained this
case as indicating the Constitution only protects the right “to participate in . . . elections on an
equal basis with other qualified voters.”147
In 1974, in Storer v. Brown, the Court held, “As a practical matter, there must be a
substantial regulation of elections to ensure they are fair and orderly.”148 The Court indicated
restrictions would be upheld so long as not “invidious, discriminatory, or excessively
burdensome.”149 Thus, courts have allowed state governments to put “reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions” on voting.150 These restrictions enjoy a legal presumption of
validity under “rational basis” scrutiny, and the burden of proof falls upon the challenging
plaintiff to show the restriction is not “sufficiently justified by an important state interest.”151
Justice William Brennan, however, in his dissenting opinion, stated, “The right to vote derives
from the right of association that is at the core of the First Amendment,” and thus, courts should
subject voting regulations to strict scrutiny.152
Then, in 1983, the Supreme Court seemed to swing back toward closer scrutiny of voting
regulations.153 In Anderson v. Celebrezze, described as a freedom of association case, the
Supreme Court held that a voter’s interests under the First Amendment required the Court to
strike down a restrictive filing deadline in Ohio for independent candidates.154 Although the
Court did not articulate a particular level of scrutiny, the decision suggests some degree of
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intermediate scrutiny.155 Anderson had a minimal practical effect on jurisprudence because the
Court continued to engage in the “rational basis”-like scrutiny balancing burdens on voting rights
against the great deference given to the state’s interest in ensuring a fair and orderly election.156
Although Anderson had little impact on the level of scrutiny courts applied, the case provided the
analytical framework for the Burdick balancing test that the Court used to justify Hawaii’s ban
on write-in candidates in 1992.157
Subsequently, in Norman v. Reed, the Supreme Court in 1992 struck down some ballot
access requirements for political parties and upheld others.158 Again, the Court stated these
restrictions affected the First Amendment right of association for citizens to express their
political preference through voting, and these limits had to be narrowly drawn to advance a
compelling state interest, implying strict scrutiny.159 The Court, however, added the condition
“severe” to its criteria for when to apply strict scrutiny in cases alleging voting as a right of
association.160 Examples of “severe” restriction include property ownership and literacy tests.161
Ominous warning signs against full First Amendment protections for voting were present
as far back as 1986.162 In Munro v. Socialist Workers, the Supreme Court upheld a Washington
statute that required minority party candidates to receive at least one percent of all votes cast in
the primary election before the state would place the candidate’s name on the general election
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ballot.163 First, the Court explained that states have a right to require candidates to make a
preliminary showing of substantial support before placing them on the ballot and are not required
to prove evidence of voter confusion from ballot overcrowding to do so.164 On balance, the Court
held the First Amendment burdens did not outweigh the state’s interest in restricting access to
the general election ballot.165 The Court found the statute promoted voters’ freedom of
association because it required citizens to “channel their expressive activity” in a primary
campaign, before the general.166
In 1992, five months after Norman, the Court backtracked on the prior line of cases
promoting robust First Amendment protections for voting rights and signaled the Court would
tolerate non-severe restrictions, such as Hawaii’s ban on “write-in” candidates.167 Initially, in
Burdick v. Takushi, the district court concluded that the ban on write-in voting violated
petitioner's First Amendment right of expression and entered a preliminary injunction ordering
Hawaii to allow casting and tallying write-in votes.168
In a similar case, the southern district court of Indiana struck down the state’s ban on
write in candidates in Paul v. Indiana.169 Here, the plaintiff challenged the law as infringing on
their free expression and association rights of both voters and potential candidates.170 The court
noted in its analysis that it “place[d] more importance on a voter’s right to vote for the candidate
of his choice than on a candidate’s right to run for office.”171 The district courts in both Paul and
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Burdick took a step, in the context of write-in voting, where they refined the right to vote as an
element of political expression.172 Other cases also view write-in voting as a constitutionally
protected protest. In Dixon v. Maryland State Administrative Board of Election Laws, the Fourth
Circuit appellate court reasoned that write-ins for fictional or non-existent characters, such as
“Donald Duck,” do not lose constitutional protection because “the right to vote for the candidate
of one’s choice includes that right to say that no candidate is acceptable.”173
As a leading First Amendment scholar, Alexander Meiklejohn, explained, “[t]he freedom
that the First Amendment protects is…the presence of self-government.”174 Citizens vote to elect
representatives after selecting certain ideas through political expression.175 As the Burdick
district court wrote, “Political participation should not be limited to those who adhere to the
ideals and goals of the major political parties.”176 Thus, the district courts incorporated the
theoretical interdependence between voting and political expression into jurisprudence.177
On the other hand, both Burdick and Paul suggest the possibility that certain state
interests may outweigh the unrestricted right to write-in.178 For instance, the state has a write to
ensure that victorious write-in candidates are legally qualified to hold their elected office.179
Reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit court of appeals in Burdick held that although
prohibiting write-in votes “places some restrictions” on citizens’ rights of expression, the burden
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is justified given Hawaii’s ease of access to ballots, providing sufficient alternatives to voters to
express their political beliefs, and the state’s broad power and interest in regulating elections.180
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that Hawaii’s ban was sufficiently justified. Regarding
the right of association, the Court stated, “Each provision of a code, ‘whether it governs the
registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting
process itself, inevitably affects-at least to some degree-the individual's right to vote and his right
to associate with others for political ends.’”181 Instead, the Court asserted, “the mere fact that a
State's system ‘creates barriers ... tending to limit the field of candidates from which voters might
choose ... does not of itself compel close scrutiny.’”182 The Court elaborated on the state’s
interest in preventing voter confusion and fraud at the polls as a legitimate one and lowered the
level of review to something akin to rational basis review with the court presuming the validity
of the state law and requiring the challenger prove an unconstitutional burden on voting rights.183
Interestingly, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s dissent agrees with the majority that the right of
expression is not implicated in this case because “the purpose of casting, counting, and recording
votes is to elect public officials, not to serve as a general forum for political expression.”184
All Supreme Court justices in Burdick agreed that voting only determines office holders,
and does not contribute to the marketplace of ideas.185 The Fourth Circuit’s holding that a writein vote can be an expression of dissent in Dixon now lacked constitutional support.186 The
Burdick court also minimized the potential burden of Hawaii’ ban of write-in candidates, even if
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voting were speech, when the majority identified the ban as only burdening voters who identify
their candidate late in the election process.187 The dissent noted that this reasoning, however,
ignores the significance of late breaking information upon the electorate.188 Another point of
contention lies in the majority failing to mention the dominance of the Democratic Party in
Hawaii.189 The dissent points out that any party who uses an election law to maintain the status
quo provides strong evidence of the unconstitutionality of those laws.190
Derfner and Hebert concluded that voting rights should be given full First Amendment
protection and offered a viable alternative model for subjecting restrictive voter ID laws to strict
scrutiny.191 The Supreme Court has never explicitly said voting should not receive the same First
Amendment protections as speech.192 Analogous case law, however, supports full First
Amendment protection for the right to vote as giving “opportunities for all voters to express their
own political preferences.”193
Other expressive functions implicated by voting are strong.194 First, a vote is expressive
regardless of whether the voter even casts a ballot.195 Unlike many other countries, the United
States does not require citizens to vote.196 The decision not to vote may express protest, in itself,
to the unresponsiveness of government.197 Second, ignoring the expressive nature of voting
contradicts the robust protections granted to monetary expression in politics.198
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In its 1976 seminal case, Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court held “money is speech [i]n
a republic where people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices
among candidates for office is essential.”199 Voters then take the information from the
marketplace of ideas and make decisions about whose views to adopt.200 The Court stated in a
footnote, the “central purpose of the Speech and Press Clauses was to assure a society in
which…public debate concerning matters of public interest would thrive, for only in such a
society can a healthy representative democracy flourish”.201
The footnote cites the 1964 case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, where Sullivan was an
elected commissioner of the Montgomery, Alabama, police department.202 The Court stated that
First Amendment speech does not lose constitutional protection to which it would otherwise be
entitled because it appears in the form of a paid advertisement.203
When asserting the advertisement served as constitutionally-protected expression, this
Court cited NAACP v. Button, which stated the various political functions of the advertisement,
including “communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed
abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives
are matters of the highest public interest and concern.”204 The Court explained, “That erroneous
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statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression
are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need…to survive.’”205
The Court addressed both First Amendment freedom of association and expression in
NAACP v. Button.206 The First Amendment protects abstract discussion and vigorous advocacy
to the lawful end of opposing government intrusion of individual rights.207
In sum, Buckley held that campaign spending is a form of protected political speech so a
“healthy representative democracy can flourish.”208 Sullivan protected an advertisement as
political expression that “communicated information” and “expressed opinion.”209 Button held
abstract discussion and vigorous advocacy to be protected forms of expression.210 All of these
activities ultimately attempt to influence and may culminate in the expression of one’s political
preference via the ballot box.211 Thus, Derfner and Hebert concluded that the Court should
reverse Burdick’s “rational basis”-like standard for analyzing voting regulations and place the
right to vote at the “top of the pantheon” of protected First Amendment rights.212
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW
Our modern-day conception of free expression includes the right to form and hold beliefs
and opinions on any subject and to communicate those ideas using any medium.213 At the same
time, controversial legal issues arise when courts reconcile free expression rights with other
individual and societal interests.214 An effective system of free expression mandates a realistic
administrative structure.215 Legal theorist and architect of civil liberties law, Thomas Emerson,
examines the legal foundations upon which free expression rests in the United States.216
This chapter reviews the theoretical foundation of the freedom of expression, which
encompasses both speech and press rights in the First Amendment, as developed by Thomas
Emerson. Then, the focus shifts toward individual and social values of free expression, including
the social foundation of self-governance explicated by Alexander Meiklejohn. Finally, some
scholars suggest that voter ID laws may be more closely scrutinized by courts if challenged
under explicit provisions of state constitutions that grant voters a fundamental right to vote.
Our system of free expression rests upon four major values.217 While the validity of the
values has never been proven or disproven, our society acts upon the faith that they hold true.218
First, free expression is essential to assure individual self-fulfillment.219 Second, the system
ensures knowledge advancement and the discovery of truth.220
More aligned with the purpose of this thesis, the third value states that freedom of
expression allows participation in political decision-making, participation for all members of
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society.221 The Declaration of Independence, which states governments “derive their just powers
from the consent of the governed,” contains the roots of this premise.222 The final value is that
the system of free expression allows for a more adaptable and stable community.223 The
principles of the system must constantly be reshaped to meet new social conditions or threats to
existence.224 Any suppression of discussion makes rational judgment impossible and substitutes
force for reason.225
In 1970, Emerson wrote that the Supreme Court had not developed any comprehensive
theory of what the Constitution guarantees regarding the meaning of free expression or how the
lower courts should apply free expression theory in cases.226 Often, the Court avoids First
Amendment issues entirely by invoking other doctrines, such as vagueness or overbreadth.227 At
other times, the commonly used a balancing test often producing inconsistent results.228
In his 1963 article, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, Emerson
developed a more comprehensive First Amendment theory.229 He stated that achieving a system
of free expression could only be possible if expression received full First Amendment
protection.230 That means expression must be protected against all government curtailment even
when in conflict with other social interests.231 As opposed to how the Court usually develops
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First Amendment doctrine by balancing expression against other social values, Emerson
explained that the judiciary should instead define key terms, like expression, abridge, and law.232
Emerson stated that “abridge” usually means when the government limits expression to
advance other interests.233 The definition, however, becomes obscure when the government
attempts to regulate the internal operations of the system of expression, such as voter
identification laws.234 Finally, the context of “law” arises largely within the rights of expression
in private associations.235
Freedom of Speech and Self-Governance
Philosopher and free-speech advocate, Alexander Meiklejohn acknowledged that
Americans view ourselves as politically free.236 He said, “If men are to be governed, then the
governing must be done, not by others, but by themselves.”237 Then, Meiklejohn admits that the
American political program of self-government is a work in progress.238
The foundation of every self-governing plan is an agreement between all citizens that all
matters of public policy shall be decided by “corporate actions,” or majority rule.239 Such
decisions shall be equally binding on citizens, whether they agreed or not, and if need be, the
decisions shall, by legal procedure, be enforced by the government upon anyone who refuses to
conform to these decisions.240 Since both systems require some form of obedience, Meiklejohn
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explained that government by “consent” means people can talk about their government, not
always in terms it favors, regarding their rights and their ability to reason.241
The First Amendment does not necessarily forbid abridging all forms of speech, such as
libelous assertions, slander, or incitement.242 Here, the interests of promoting the general welfare
outweigh the speaker’s individual rights.243
When self-governing men demand free speech, they are not saying that every individual
has the right to speak whenever on whatever topic.244 The ultimate issue is not the words of the
speaker.245 The First Amendment protects the minds of the hearers to inform them of all content
on a public issue.246 “It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which
the First Amendment is directed,” said Meiklejohn.247
The distinction between public and private interests becomes clearer when comparing the
First Amendment to the Fifth Amendment text, “No person shall be…deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”248 The Supreme Court has defined “liberty” to include
“liberty of speech.”249 The difference in the amendments is that the Fifth Amendment appears to
deal with a class of utterances which the legislature may legitimately address, such as libel or
Id. at 10. Under the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution “We the People” agreed to be self-governed and all other
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slander, which are private rights.250 In contrast, the First Amendment deals with public utterances
which the legislature may never address even with due process.251
Under the Constitution, citizens agreed to be self-governed by corporate actions and
defined “just powers” of the government.252 In the compact, government power does not mean
that someone else has power over citizens.253 Instead, the citizens select who is given governing
authority through voting.254
In 1955, Meiklejohn testified before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights and addressed voting rights.255 Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes the
people as “electors” to choose their representatives.256 Meiklejohn said, “We the people are not
only the supreme agency. We are also, politically, an active electorate—a Fourth, or perhaps
better, a First Branch which, through its reserved powers, governs at the polls.”257 It follows that
under the Constitution, Americans are politically free only insofar as voting is free.258
When citizens vote, they not only choose among candidates, but also among the issues.259
As a self-governing body, the people have two demands to promote the general welfare.260 First,
judgment of public issues must be free and independent.261 Second, citizens must be equally free
and independent in expressing their choice at the polls.262 Meiklejohn wrote, “Censorship over
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our thinking, duress over our voting; are alike forbidden by the First Amendment.”263
Accordingly, any person or governing body that practices censorship or duress stands in
“contempt” of the sovereign people of the United States.264
Citizens exercise multiple expressive processes through voting in a self-governing
system.265 First, people make up their minds by reading printed records of thoughts and beliefs of
others.266 People express thoughts through active associations in private and public discussion.267
Finally, the voter must be allowed on Election Day to express their choice using a ballot.268
Even though voting is typically done in secret or anonymously, this practice is not
universal.269 For example, Iowa uses public caucuses to vote in presidential primary elections. 270
Regardless, the Supreme Court has consistently given strong protection to anonymous speech in
campaign finance cases.271 While individuals may cast their ballot anonymously, citizens first
declare their choice to participate in the democratic process in front of their community and
create a public record of their choice.272 States then publish the aggregated votes and convey the
electorate’s opinions of various candidates, ballot propositions, recalls, or referendums.273
Free Expression Values
Free expression values fall into two distinct models.274 The liberty model focuses on
values of the individual, while the audience model focuses primarily on societal values.275 First,
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the liberty model includes one’s right to communicate and publish information, along with other
values, such as autonomy, self-fulfillment, and self-realization.276 The liberty model also allows
individuals to participate in democracy and search for the truth.277 The audience model, however,
focuses on society’s right’s to receive information.278 Corresponding audience values include:
enabling self-governance, checking government, creating a marketplace of ideas, maintaining a
balance between social stability and change, and fostering toleration.279
The first individual value, individual autonomy and democracy, is rooted in Emerson’s
four key values of freedom of expression as articulated in The System of Freedom of
Expression.280 Emerson explained that one’s ability to express ideas, without fear of censorship,
is essential to developing personal dignity and affirming one’s sense of personal autonomy.281 He
elaborated that individuals must also be able to discover truth through discussion and debate,
which is essential to the ultimate good of society.282 Finally, Emerson describes a necessary part
of free expression as allowing one to assert opinions as both autonomous individuals and as
members of society.283
Individual autonomy and self-realization is the second individual value, which was first
articulated by leading First Amendment scholar, C. Edwin Baker in his article, “Scope of the
First Amendment Freedom of Speech.”284 Baker advocated for a broad “liberty model” that
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required the community to respect “the dignity and equal worth” of individual members.285
Under Baker’s model, the speakers would have the freedom to choose the content of their speech
that fosters self-realization without interfering with the same legitimate claim of others.286 The
government could only limit speech to non-violent, non-coercive activities to avoid causing harm
to other individuals.287
Autonomy and self-realization is another individual value.288 Two of the early theorists
include John Milton and John Stuart Mill.289 In 1644, English poet, John Milton, published
Areopagatica, wherein he laid a foundational model for personal liberty and freedom from
censorship.290 Two centuries later, British philosopher and political economist, John Stuart Mill,
published On Liberty in 1859.291 Mill argued that government suppression, either upon
individuals or the press, undermined human development.292 Emphasizing individual liberty,
Mill referred to expression as linked to the “sphere of life in which ‘society…has, if any, only an
indirect interest.’”293 This individual sphere contains four components: 1) “the inward domain of
consciousness,” 2) “liberty of conscience,” 3) “liberty of thought and feeling,” and 4) “absolute
freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects.”294
In contrast, the audience model, which may also be considered a societal model, focuses
solely on society’s right’s to receive information or their right to know.295 These societal values
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include: enabling self-governance, providing a check on government, creating a marketplace of
ideas, maintaining a balance between social stability and change, and fostering toleration.296
The first societal value is audience and self-governance, which is rooted in Meiklejohn’s
theory of free speech detailed in his 1948 book, Free Speech and Its Relation to SelfGovernment.297 As opposed to the liberty model theorists, Meiklejohn provides narrower
protection for free expression.298 As previously discussed, he proposed a constitutional
dichotomy wherein the First Amendment absolutely protects speech on matters of governing
importance, referred to as public speech.299 Other types of speech, or private speech, fell under
the more limited protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.300
Audiences and democracy is the second societal value advocated by prominent First
Amendment theorist, Harry Kalven, Jr., following New York Times v. Sullivan in 1964.301 As
discussed, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the New York Times when the paper published
allegedly libelous statements in an advertisement, some of which were false and others were true,
about police action during a civil rights demonstration.302 Here, Kalven explained that if the
Court allowed sanctioning speech for government criticism, then the ruling may dissuade other
speakers from making true, critical statements about the government.303
Another societal value that addresses freedom of expression and democracy focuses First
Amendment protections on the public’s “right to know.”304 The leading theorist on this value,
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Emerson proposed, in 1976, that the “right to know” is an “integral part” of a well-functioning
system of free expression with two related features.305 First, the public has the right to read, to
listen, to see, and to receive communications.306 The public also possesses the corollary right to
obtain information as a basis for transmitting ideas or facts to others.307 Combined these rights
form the reverse of one’s right to communicate and serves the crucial role of ensuring the
electorate remains informed.308 Emerson suggested that this value could be of the greatest value
to society when exercised by the public to obtain information from government actors.309
The next audience-based value is the marketplace of ideas.310 Developed by Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his 1919 dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States,
when the majority upheld the conviction a group of self-proclaimed “revolutionists” charged
with espionage for printing leaflets to resist U.S. war efforts.311 A major First Amendment
scholar, Rodney Smolla, suggested the marketplace value emphasizes the societal component of
the public’s search for the truth.312 Some scholars, however, have indicated the marketplace
theory has fundamentally flawed assumptions.313 For example, Baker criticized the theory for
failing in an unrestricted economic society where individuals lack equal access to media, or
where media monopolies could limit the diversity of viewpoints available in media.314
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Maintaining social stability while also facilitating change is another societal value, which
presumes a free flow of information benefits society by acting as a safety valve that enriches
discussion and debate.315 When the safety value is off, secrecy and violence could result.316
Relatedly, the final societal value is toleration, which was developed by Professor Lee C.
Bollinger, a First Amendment legal scholar.317 Bollinger suggested that a system of free
expression is one wherein people share and receive diverse opinions.318 He wrote, “Through
toleration…we create the community.”319 Bollinger proposed that listening to extreme
viewpoints that may contradict one’s beliefs may help individuals in search of truth.320
In sum, the audience-based values prioritize the benefits of free expression to society.321
On the other hand, liberty-based values prioritize the benefits of free expression for individual
communicators.322 Courts may draw distinctions amongst values when considering how much
First Amendment protections to give certain acts.323 For example, Meiklejohn’s theory would
only provide absolute First Amendment protection to speech that facilitates self-governance, or
societal good.324
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
RQ 1: How do courts, if at all, analyze voter identification law challenges as infringing on First
Amendment freedom of expression?
RQ 2: What individual or societal expression values, if any, do courts invoke when addressing
challenges to voter identification laws?
RQ 3: How do courts’ analysis differ, if at all, for voter identification challenges under state
constitutional provisions explicitly providing for a fundament right to vote?
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CHAPTER 5. METHODS
This study reviews a categorical overview of state voter ID law that the National Council
of State Legislatures identified as being in effect in 2018 and then reviews how courts have
analyzed voter ID laws under the First Amendment.325 Since the U.S. Supreme Court published
its most relevant opinion in 2008 in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, this thesis
focuses on court rulings published since 2008.
According to a National Council of State Legislatures study, sixteen states do not require
voters to present any documentation to vote.326 The remaining thirty-four states require some
form of identification before voting.327 The author of this thesis identified any major trends in the
laws identified in the Council’s study.
The Council further divides the 34 states based upon whether the states require a voter
lacking an ID to take additional steps for their provisional ballot to count or not, known as strict
and non-strict states respectively.328 The author of this thesis broke down the various actions
required by voters and ranked each state law from least to most onerous on voters. The author
classified the alternative means states use to verify a voter’s identity and ranked each state from
least to most onerous on voters. Then, the author identified any clusters of states that imposed the
same or similar burdens on voters to cast a provisional ballot.
This study attempted a systematic review of post-Crawford state high court, U.S. Court
of Appeals, and U.S. district court rulings between May 2008 and May 2018 to determine
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whether and how courts address free expression theory by reading courts opinions to determine if
any First Amendment arguments were raised.329 In addition, the analysis examined whether and
how plaintiffs or courts addressed free expression values in explaining why voting implicated
First Amendment protection.330 Finally, the analysis concluded with examining voter ID
challenges under various state constitutions to examine whether the level of judicial scrutiny or
analytical framework used by the courts differed.331
The case analysis focused on state high courts’ rulings and U.S. Court of Appeals’ rulings
because state high courts have binding authority over lower state courts within their respective
states.332 The author also reviewed the federal district court rulings reviewed by these higher
courts, some even predating Crawford, for a more detailed explication of the evidence presented
in the case and to gain context on how Crawford changed the analysis of voter ID cases.333
The author identified cases by searching the online versions of Westlaw, which is a
leading legal database used by legal scholars.334 Search criteria limitations included voter
identification cases reported after April 28, 2008, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in
Crawford.335
The searches were performed using Boolean keyword searches, using “Boolean logic,” or
a mathematical formula that uses specific words and operators to narrow searches.”336 Search
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one illustrates the sample size of cases available on Westlaw classified as “voter identification,”
and Search two limits the results further to voter identification cases with First Amendment
claims. The keyword searches used by this author in the database consisted of:
Search 1 = ("voter identification" OR "voter ID") % contribution = 305 cases
Search 2 = ("freedom #of expression" OR "freedom #of speech" OR "free speech")
AND ("First Amendment") AND ("voter identification" OR "voter ID") %
contribution = 33 cases
The “%” represents “but not” in Boolean logic. This search criterion was added to the search
logic to exclude cases concerning campaign contributions. The final search yielded thirty-three
cases with First Amendment claims out of the entire sample of three hundred and five voter ID
cases, which preliminarily indicates that First Amendments claims were addressed in almost
eleven percent of voter identification appellate court cases. After reviewing all thirty-three cases
with First Amendment claims, the author eliminated twenty-eight election law cases that did not
challenge voter ID laws.337
Of the five cases remaining, Veasey v. Perry appeared twice in the search results at two
different stages in the posture of the case, and the author analyzed these two results together.338
Next, ACLU of New Mexico v. Santillanes yielded an appellate court decision reversing the lower
court opinion that came down right after Crawford.339 The author also reviewed the district court
ruling, even though it predates Crawford, for context on how Crawford changed the analysis of
voter ID cases.340 Since scholarship cited for this study also addressed a state constitutional

337

Of the 28 eliminated cases, eight dealt with electioneering and get-out-the-vote efforts, fourteen dealt with ballot
access for candidates or organizations collecting early ballots, and three dealt with local property tax elections to
raise revenues for public schools. The final three cases dealt with miscellaneous topics, including the First
Amendment right to petition government, separation of powers, and compelled disclosure of criminal suspects’
emails in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
338
Veasey v. Perry, 29 F.Supp.3d 896 (S.D. Texas 2014) and Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d 627 (S.D. Texas 2014).
339
The Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2008).
340
Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d 598 (D.N.M. 2007).
40

challenge in Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, that opinion was also analyzed.341
Since Applewhite addressed a state constitutional challenge, two recent 2018 decisions
challenging Alabama and Oklahoma’s voter ID laws under their respective state constitutions
also were reviewed.342 Therefore, the sample for the study is seven cases or N=7. The thesis also
examined relative cases identified in literature and opinions reviewed for the thesis.343
The author used traditional textual analysis to assess whether and how courts discussed
First Amendment theory and values when explaining rationales for holdings, concurrences, or
dissents.344 Opinions categories included: 1) discussing free expression theory and values; 2)
discussing free expression theory and not values; 3) discussing free expression values and not
theory; 4) not discussing free expression.345 When a court addressed free expression values, these
values were further divided into individual or social values as found in the literature.346
Regarding free expression theory, this study first searches for references to any of
Emerson’s four values of free expression: 1) assure individual self-fulfillment, 2) advance
knowledge and the discovery of truth, 3) promote political decision-making for all members of
society, and 4) allow for a more adaptable and stable community.347 Next, since Meiklejohn
specifically addressed voting as speech in his 1955 testimony before the U.S. Senate
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights,348 this study addresses Meiklejohn’s assertion that the
First Amendment provides absolute protection to ideas and beliefs regarding matters of public
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governance.349 In contrast, he asserted the complementary Fifth Amendment provides only
qualified due process protections for private speech, such as libel or slander.350 This study also
assesses whether opinions address Meiklejohn’s identification of multiple expressive processes
exercised through voting, such as reading printed information and participating in public and
private discussions, or their expression of choice using a ballot.351
When identifying individual and societal free expression values, the study uses the
scholar’s explications of those values.352 The individual values include autonomy, selffulfillment, self-realization, the discovery of truth, and participation in political decisionmaking.353 The societal values are Meiklejohn’s effective self-governance, government checking,
the marketplace of ideas, balance between social stability and change, and toleration.354
Finally, this study has several limitations.355 First, the sample restrictions were published
cases reported by Westlaw, as identified by using search tools and identified in relevant
literature.356 It is possible that some relevant cases were not included in the database or not
associated with search mechanisms used for the service or mentioned in literature.357 Also,
limiting state cases to those decided by state high courts and federal cases to district court
opinions reviewed by appellate courts may result in missing some significant discussions by
lower state courts and unappealed federal court decision.358
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Second, textual analysis introduces subjectivity into this study.359 Even though this study
explains free expression theory and values in the preceding pages, deciding which language fits
in each category requires interpretation and judgment.360 It is possible that another person who
reads these cases would place language in other categories.361 Recognizing this limit, the author
carefully read a sample of cases and applied the value explications to each one in an attempt to
minimize challenges to the consistent application of the values.362
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CHAPTER 6. ANALYSIS
This chapter first reviews state voter identification laws in effect in 2018.363 Next, this
chapter reviews the holdings and rationales of court opinions addressing voter ID laws
challenged under state or federal constitutional law after the Supreme Court gave its nod of
approval to Indiana’s voter identification laws in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.364
Sixteen states, including New Mexico and Pennsylvania, do not require any
documentation to vote.365 In the case analysis that follows, ACLU of New Mexico v. Santillanes
did not involve a dispute over a statewide New Mexico ID law.366 Instead, the issue of the case
involved an ID requirement for voting in local Albuquerque elections.367
Pennsylvania, on the other hand, had a statewide photo ID law in effect in 2012, which
was struck down by a state commonwealth court in Applewhite v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania as violating the state’s constitutionally-provided fundmental right to vote.368 As
noted in the literature, on the first review, the commonwealth court did not apply strict scrutiny
and upheld the law.369 After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded the case back to the
lower court, the court applied strict scrutiny and found the state had not adequately proven a
compelling state interest for the ID law or the narrow tailoring to meet that interest, so the law
struck down.370 Since the 2012 Applewhite decision, Pennsylvania requires no documentation to
cast a ballot.371
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Thirty-four states require some form of identification to vote.372 Based on the laws in
effect in 2018, 17 states request some form of photo ID, such as a driver’s license, state-issued
ID card, military ID, or tribal ID.373 The other 17 states accept non-photo IDs, such as bank
statements or utility bills with the voter’s name and address.374
The National Council of State Legislatures categorized state voter ID laws in two
ways.375 First, the council sorted laws by whether the state requires a photo ID or accepts a nonphoto ID to vote.376 Second, the council divided the laws as “strict” or “non-strict” based on
subsequent actions required by voters to cast a ballot when voters lack a required ID. 377 Table 1
illustrates the classification of laws of all 34 states with voter ID laws in effects in 2018.
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Table 1. NCSL Classification of 34 States with Voter ID Laws in Effect in 2018
Strict
(subsequent trips required for the
provisional ballot to count)

Non-Strict
(no subsequent trips required for the
provisional ballot to count)

Photo ID Required
Georgia
Indiana
Kansas
Mississippi
Tennessee
Virginia
Wisconsin378
Arkansas
Alabama
Florida
Hawaii
Idaho
Louisiana
Michigan
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Texas380

Non-Photo ID Accepted
Arizona
North Dakota
Ohio379

Alaska
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Iowa
Kentucky
Missouri
Montana
New Hampshire
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Utah
Washington
West Virginia381

Then, the National Council of State Legislatures has further subdivided these 34 state
laws based upon whether the law requires subsequent steps by the voter who does not possess the
requisite identification.382 The council labeled these state requirements as either “strict” or “nonstrict.”383 In strict states, voters lacking an accepted ID may cast a provisional ballot but must
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also take additional steps after the election for their vote to count, such as returning to the local
election official within days of the election to present their required ID.384 In non-strict states,
voters lacking an ID may have the option to cast a provisional ballot to be counted without any
further actions by the voter.385 For example, in Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Montana, Rhode
Island, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia, voters lacking ID cast a provisional ballot, and
later, election officials use signature matching to verify the voter’s registration status.386
First, the National Council of State Legislatures has classified 17 state laws as photo-ID
required, including states with voter ID laws reviewed by courts in the case analysis and denoted
by an asterisk in the table below, such as Georgia, Indiana, Wisconsin, Alabama, and Texas.387
The other states included are Kansas, Mississippi, Tennessee, Virginia, Arkansas, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Rhode Island, and South Dakota.388 Table 2 and discussion
that follows analyzed the relative “strictness” of the each of the state’s photo ID requirements.389
For example, the table denotes various types of ID accepted to vote for each state.390 Then the
discussion classifies some states as “stricter” than others if it accepted fewer types of IDs, and
“less strict” if states accepted more forms of ID.391
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Table 2. Photo ID Required by State Law & Types of Photo IDs Accepted
State

Driver’s
License/State-issued
ID / Free Voter ID
Card

Indiana*

DL, State, and Voter

Georgia*
Kansas
Mississippi
Tennessee
Virginia

DL, even if expired,
State, and Voter
DL-any state
DL, State, and Voter
DL and State
DL and State

Wisconsin*

Government
Employee
ID /
Employee
ID
Gov’t

Passport/
Naturalization
Certificate /
Tribal ID

Gov’t

P and T

Gov’t
Gov’t

P
P
P
P and T

S and PA
S

DL and State

P, N, and T

M and V

Arkansas

DL, State, and Voter

P

S with
expiration
S and PA

Alabama*
Florida

DL, State, and Voter
DL and State

Gov’t
Gov’t

P and T
P

S
S and PA

M
M, V, and G

Hawaii

DL and State

Idaho

DL and State

Gov’t

P and T

S, even
high school

G

Louisiana

DL and State

Michigan

DL and State Expired I/S or
current O/S
DL and State

Gov’t

South
Dakota

DL and State

Gov’t

Texas*

DL, State, and Voter

Rhode
Island

Gov’t and
Employee

Student ID
/ Public
Assistance
Card

Military ID /
Veteran ID /
Gun Permit

P

Additional
Information

Must have Name,
Photo, and
Expiration
M
M and G
M and G
M and G

S

M and G

May also need
proof of residence
Must have Name,
Photo, and
Expiration
Debit/Credit Card
Ret./Neighborhood
ID
Utility Bill/Bank
Statement/ Check

Any other
recognized ID
P&T

S, even
high school

M

P

S, from any
U.S.
institution
S

M and G

Gov’t medical card

M and G

All within 4 years
of expiration, exc.
Nat cert.

P and T
P and N
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Georgia accepts the following seven forms of ID to vote, including expired Georgia
driver’s licenses, but not student IDs.392 Overall, the state was found to be “medium” strict.393
Georgia was less strict than Indiana because Indiana requires name, expiration date, and
photo issued only from the state or national government.394 Georgia, however, was both less and
more strict than the Kansas law.395 Georgia was less strict than Kansas because Kansas only
accepts expired IDs for people 65 and older.396 In contrast, Georgia was stricter because Kansas
accepts a broader range of IDs, including student IDs and public assistance IDs.397 Georgia was
also stricter than Mississippi because Mississippi accepts student IDs and firearms licenses.398
Georgia was both less and more strict than Wisconsin.399 Georgia was stricter because
Wisconsin accepts certificates of naturalization.400 On the other hand, Wisconsin is stricter
because Wisconsin also requires proof of residence if the ID presented does not indicate the
voter’s address.401 Also, even though Wisconsin accepts student IDs, few IDs practically qualify
under the state condition mandating a signature and expiration date.
In 2011, Texas enacted a voter ID law also accepting seven forms of ID, including a
driver’s license, concealed carry permit, or citizenship certificate.402 All forms of ID, except for
the citizenship certificate, may be presented within four years of expiration.403 Overall, the state

392

GA. CODE §21-2-417 (2010).
Id.
394
IND. CODE §3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2 and 3-11-8-25.1 (2014).
395
KAN. STAT. §25-2908, 25-1122, 25-3002, and 8-1324(g)(2) (2012).
396
Id.
397
Id.
398
MISS. CODE §23-15-563 (2013).
399
WIS. STAT. §5.02(6m) and 6.79(2)(a) (2014).
400
Id.
401
Id.
402
Id.
403
Id.
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was found to be “very” strict.404 In fact, the law was struck down by a court in 2014 in Veasey v.
Perry, but higher courts stayed the injunction and later allowed the law to be applied.405
The district judge in Veasey even cited a 2014 study by the National Council of State
Legislatures to show that the Texas law is “comparatively the strictest law in the country.”406
Then, the court discussed safety net features, which Texas failed to adopt, “including soft
rollouts (which Texas did not adopt), educational campaigns (which are lacking in Texas), the
time frame during which an expired ID will be accepted (a matter on which Texas is relatively
strict), the time frame in which provisional ballots may be cured (a matter on which Texas is
arguably in the middle ground), and terms on which provisional ballots may be cured (where
Texas’s requirements that the voter still produce a qualified photo ID make it strict).”407
The Texas law was stricter than Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, and Rhode Island laws.408 In
fact, Hawaii does not even specify acceptable types of ID by law.409 The Hawaii office of
elections does provide examples, including even non-photo IDs that contain a voter’s name and
address.410 Idaho allows tribal IDs and student IDs as alternatives.411 Louisiana contains a catchall provision “other generally recognized picture IDs.”412 Rhode Island accepts valid and current
IDs from any U.S. educational institution.413 On the other hand, Texas was less strict than South
Dakota, which only accepts student IDs and tribal IDs as alternatives to state-issued IDs.414

404

Underhill, supra note 325.
Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d 627 (S.D. Texas 2014).
406
Id. at 643.
407
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Underhill, supra note 325.
409
Id.
410
HAW. REV. STAT. §11-136 (2014).
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IDAHO CODE §34-1106(2), 1113, and 1114 (2017).
412
LA. REV. STAT. §18:562 (2011).
413
R.I. GEN. LAWS §17-19-24.2 (2015).
414
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §12-18-6.1 and 6.2 (2014).
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Second, the National Council of State Legislatures classified 17 state laws as non-photo
ID accepted, including Oklahoma’s ID law endorsed by the state Supreme Court in Gentges v.
State Election Board in 2018, denoted by an asterisk in the table below.415 Other states included
are Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, New
Hampshire, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Arizona, North Dakota, and
Ohio.416 The table below addressed the relative “strictness” of each state’s ID law by noting the
types of ID accepted.417 Then, the discussion classified some states as “stricter” than others if
they accepted fewer types of IDs, and “less strict” if the state accepted more forms of ID.418

415

Underhill, supra note 325. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 7-114 (2016) and Gentges v. State Election Board, 2018
OK 39 (Okla. 2018).
416
Underhill, supra note 325. See ALASKA STAT. §15.15.225 (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. §1-1-104(19.5) and 1-7-110
(2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. §9-261 (2012); DEL. CODE tit. 15, §4937 (2017); IOWA CODE §48A.7A, 48A.10A, 49.78,
and 49.81 (2014); KY. REV. STAT. §117.227 (2014); MO. REV. STAT. §115-427 (2016); MONT. CODE §13-13-114
(2017); N.H. REV. STAT. §659:13 (2017); S.C. CODE §7-13-710 (2014); UTAH CODE §20A-1-102(83) and 20A-3-104
(2010); WASH. REV. CODE §29A.40.160(7)(a) (2017); W. VA. CODE §3-1-34 (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §16-579(A)
(2012); N.D. CENT. CODE §16.1-05-07 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE §3503.16(B)(1)(a) and 3505.18(A)(1) (2006).
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Underhill, supra note 325.
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Table 3. Types of IDs Accepted, Including Non-Photo ID Accepted, by State Law
State

Driver’s
License/Stateissued ID / Free
Voter ID Card /
Tribal ID

Alaska
Colorado

DL and Voter
DL

Utility Bill/
Bank
Statement /
Check /
Debit Card
/ Credit
Card
U, B, and C
U, B, and C

Connecticut

Passport/
Naturalization
Certificate /
Birth Certificate
/ Social Security
Card
P and BC
N and BC

Student ID /
Government
Employee ID
/ Employee
ID / Medicare
or Medicaid
ID
Gov’t and
Med.

Military ID
/ Veteran
ID / Gun
Permit /
Hunt
License
H
M

SS

Delaware

DL and State

Iowa

Montana

DL, State, and
Voter
DL
DL and State –
any state
DL and T

New
Hampshire

DL – any state,
State, and Voter

Oklahoma*

DL, State, and
T

South
Carolina

DL, State, and
Voter

P

M

Utah

DL, State, and
T

P

M and G

Washington

DL, State, and
T
DL, State, and
T
DL, State, and
T
DL, State, and
T

Kentucky
Missouri

Virginia
Arizona
North Dakota

Ohio

DL and State

U and C
P
CC
U, B, and C

Additional
Information

Revenue ID
Pilot License
Any other with
name and either
address,
signature, or
photo
Any other with
name and address

M

SS
S
S – even high
school
S

U, B, and C
P

M

Any other ID
accepted by
election
supervisors
Any other with
name, photo, and
expiration
Affidavit and
reasonable
impediment
2 forms of ID
with name and
address

S and E
P

S and E
Gov’t

U and B
U, B, and C

U, B, and C
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M
Other Unique
Examples
Requires Name,
Address, and
DOB
Requires Name,
Address, Photo,
and Exp. Date

Oklahoma requires “proof of identity” showing one’s name, a photograph, and expiration
date, issued by either the federal government, state, or an Indian tribe.419 The state also offers a
non-photo voter registration card.420 Overall, the state was found to be “medium” strict.421
Compared to Colorado and Washington, the Oklahoma law is less strict because both
states provide specific lists of ID options.422 Both Colorado and Washington, however, recently
passed laws resulting in mostly voting by mail now, so the ID provision doesn’t have as large of
an impact in these states.423 Compared to Delaware, Oklahoma was stricter because Delaware’s
broad catch-all provision allows “any government document with a voter’s name and
address.”424
The Oklahoma law was less strict than the current Iowa law, but Iowa is transitioning to
requiring a photo ID before voting.425 Currently, Iowa provides a list of acceptable IDs,
including non-photo ID cards, or sign an oath verifying identity to cast a regular ballot.426 In
2019, voters will either produce an ID or cast a provisional ballot and show up after the election
with an ID, so the National Council of State Legislatures might reclassify Iowa as a “strict, nonphoto ID” state in 2019.427 On the other hand, Oklahoma was stricter than New Hampshire
because New Hampshire accepts driver’s licenses from any state, even expired licenses.428
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OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 7-114 (2016).
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422
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Underhill, supra note 325.
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Arizona allows a broad, unique list of non-photo ID options, including a valid Arizona
vehicle registration, vehicle insurance card, property tax statement or Indian census card.429 Ohio
was stricter because the photo option requires the ID be current and valid with the voter’s name,
address, photo, and expiration date.430 Ohio’s non-photo option is only a voter’s current utility
bill, bank statement, government check, or paycheck.431 For a state that did not require any ID to
cast a ballot until 2013, North Dakota is about as strict as Ohio’s law.432
Third, the National Council of State Legislatures classifies ten states as strict because
these state laws require voters to return to a local election offical with an ID within days of an
election for their provisional ballot to count.433 The states included are Georgia, Indiana, Kansas,
Mississippi, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin, Arizona, North Dakota, and Ohio with an asterisk
denoting states laws reviewed by courts in the case analysis.434 Table 3 and following discussion
ranks the additional steps required to cast a provisional ballot from least to most onerous.435
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ARIZ. REV. STAT. §16-579(A) (2012).
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Table 4. Strict Provisional Voting by State Law & Subsequent Deadlines
State (ranked
from least to
most strict)

Return with ID
Before Polls
Close

Return with ID After Election

Affidavit

Other Options

Ohio – has
tiered options

Last option: by the 10th day
after Election Day

2nd option

1st option: Provide last four digits
of social security number

Kansas

By meeting of the county
board of canvassers

Submit a copy by mail or
electronic means.

Virginia

By noon on the 3rd day after
the election

Submit a copy of ID by fax, email, or mail.

Arizona

By 5 pm on the 5th business
day after the election

Mississippi

Five days after the election

Georgia*

Three days after the election

Tennessee

By end of 2nd business day
after the election

Indiana*

By noon on Monday after the
election

North Dakota

X

By sixth day after the election.

Wisconsin*

X

By 4pm on Friday after
Election Day

As per the “strict” classification, generally, all states required additional steps by the
voter for their provisional ballot to count.436 The least onerous state was Ohio’s tiered system,
which first requests a social security number to cast a provisional ballot.437 If the voter lacks both
ID and a social security number, then the voter may execute an affidavit to cast a provisional
ballot.438 If a voter declines to execute an affidavit, the state requires the voter return with proof
of ID within ten days of the election.439 Both Kansas and Virginia offered voters an option of

436

Id.
OHIO REV. CODE §3503.16(B)(1)(a) and 3505.18(A)(1) (2006).
438
Id.
439
Id.
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submitting a copy of their ID via electronic means, such as fax or e-mail.440 The most onerous
state is Wisconsin, which requires voters to return with ID before the polls close, but also
provides an alternative of no later than 4 p.m. on Friday following Election Day.441
In July 2016, a federal district court ruled that Wisconsin’s voter ID law was
unconstitutional in One Wisconsin Institute, Inc. v. Thomsen.442 The opinion included an
anecdotal account of Mrs. Smith who lived in Milwaukee since 2003, but was born in Missouri
in 1916.443 Like many older African Americans born in the South, she does not have a birth
certificate.444 Thus, the state did not issue her a Wisconsin ID, and she could not vote in the April
2016 primary.445 The court found Mrs. Smith’s compelling story to represent the experiences of
about 100 qualified voters who tried to obtain a state ID before the 2016 primary.446 The court
stated that the state must allow an alternative for provisional voting, such as signing an
affidavit.447
The district court also stated a need to reevaluate Frank and Crawford because this case
casts doubt that voter ID laws foster integrity in elections.448 The district court found Wisconsin
to be preoccupied mostly with “phantom election fraud” leading to real disenfranchisement.449
While rejecting the plaintiff’s facial challenge as a whole citing Frank and Crawford, the judge
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KAN. STAT. §25-2908, 25-1122, 25-3002, and 8-1324(g)(2) (2012); VA. CODE §24.2-643(b) (2016).
WIS. STAT. §5.02(6m) and 6.79(2)(a) (2014).
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indicated the disastrous effects of the state-issued ID provision, ironically intended by the state
as a safety net.450 If a voter lacks a birth certificate, it takes an average of five communications
with the DMV after the initial application to get an ID.451 This Wisconsin district court found the
free ID provision to be unconstitutionally burdensome, but allowed the state to implement the
law in 2016 as long as it pledged to provide temporary free IDs and publicize the law.452
Fourth, the National Council of State Legislatures classifies the largest cluster of 24 states
as non-strict because these state ID laws offer on-site alternatives for in-person voters lacking an
appropriate ID.453 The states included are Arkansas, Alabama, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana,
Michigan, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa,
Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Washington,
and West Virginia, with an asterisk in the table below denoting any ID law reviewed by courts in
the subsequent case analysis.454 Table 4 and the discussion that follows ranks the additional steps
required to cast a provisional ballot from least to most onerous amongst the states.455
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Table 5. Non-Strict Provisional Voting by State Law & Subsequent Steps
State (ranked from
least to most strict)

Florida, Montana,
Rhode Island,
Washington, and
West Virginia
Hawaii
Alaska
Colorado
Utah

Signature matching /
Verify Information /
State’s method
unclear
Signature matching

Affidavit / Written
Oath / Detailed
Affidavit

Affidavit

Connecticut

Write name,
address, date of
birth, and sign on
state’s form.
Write name,
address, birth date,
and driver’s license
or social security
number.
Challenged voter
affidavit
Sign affidavit

Written Oath

Oklahoma*

New Hampshire
Louisiana

Texas*

Reasonable
Impediment
2 election judges
affirm identity.

Missouri

Alabama*
South Carolina

Option to Return with
ID

Verify DOB and
address
Cast “questioned
ballot”
Prelim verify by an
election official
County clerk verifies
identity & residence

Delaware, Idaho,
Michigan, and
South Dakota
Iowa and Kentucky

Arkansas

Requires Supporting
Documents

No county board
challenges, or
2 election officials
affirm identity, or
Reasonable
Impediment, or
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The poll clerk takes a
photo of the voter.
Provide voter ID
card, date of birth, or
other information.
Present a form of
“supporting ID.”

By 12 pm Monday
after the election
By 5 pm on Friday
after the election
By Thurs./Friday after
the election

The least onerous states were Florida, Rhode Island, Montana, Washington, and West
Virginia, which use signature matching.456 Next, Alaska, Colorado, and Utah require no extra
steps on the part of the voter, but are unclear as to what is involved after a provisional ballot is
cast.457 For example, county clerks in Utah verify a voter’s ID “through some other means.”458
New Hampshire offers a unique provisional ballot model that genuinely seeks to identify
cases of voter fraud by allowing voters lacking ID to execute a “challenged voter affidavit” and
immediately have their picture taken, absent a religious objection.459 Then, within 90 days after
the election, the secretary of state sends a non-forwardable letter to each voter who executed an
affidavit and instructs the person to return the letter within 90 days as written confirmation of
voting or to contact the attorney general if they did not vote, signaling the attorney general to
investigate for voter fraud.460
Louisiana and Texas require supporting documents along with a voter affidavit.461 In
Texas, a voter must submit a supporting form of ID, such as a voter registration card, original
birth certificate, utility bill, bank statement, government check, or paycheck.462 In addition, the
voter in Texas must execute a Reasonable Impediment Declaration, noting their impediment to
obtaining photo identification.463
Arkansas, Alabama, and South Carolina are the most onerous states because they give
voters the option of returning with appropriate identification.464 Arkansas generally counts

456
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provisional ballots unless the board of election commissioners determines it is invalid and should
not count.465 Alternatively, voters may return to the board with appropriate ID by noon on
Monday following the election.466 In 2017, the Arkansas legislature passed a statute allowing
voters lacking an ID to sign an affidavit to be registered.467 The law was struck down by a
district court in April 2018, but the state supreme court allowed the law for the May 2018
primary, pending the outcome on appeal.468 Alabama allows two poll workers to attest to a
voter’s identity or allows a voter to cast a provisional ballot if they return by Friday after the
election with their ID.469 Finally, South Carolina, like Texas, allows voters to execute a
Reasonable Impediment Declaration or return with ID before certifying election results.470
As a cautionary tale, comparing any two ID laws creates false equivalences. For example,
even though Georgia and Texas both accept seven forms of ID, the Georgia Supreme Court
upheld the Georgia law in Democratic Party of Georgia v. Perdue, while a federal district court
struck down the Texas law in Veasey v. Perry.471 If presenting an ID is only about verification,
Arizona offers a broad list of non-photo options with a voters’ name and address.472 Finally, the
Wisconsin district court opinion of One Wisconsin Institute v. Thomsen demonstrates that free
voter ID cards may not always be easily accessible, especially for African Americans born in the
South in the early 1900s lacking any documentation of live birth.473 Regarding provisional
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ballots, only ten states require voters lacking ID to make an additional trip, while a majority have
shifted to less onerous options.474
Finally, New Hampshire’s provisional voting procedure seems to be the only law actively
seeking to identify cases of fraud.475 Any voter who lacks required ID executes a “challenged
voter affidavit” and immediately has their picture taken.476 Then, within 90 days of the election,
the secretary of state sends a letter to each voter who completed an affidavit.477 The letter
instructs the recipient to either return the letter within 90 days to confirm voting or to contact the
attorney general if they did not to initiate an investigation of voter fraud.478
U.S. Constitutional Challenges
Of the seven cases analyzed, only three raised challenges under the U.S. Constitution. Of
those three, just a single case pre-dating Crawford raised a free expression argument, and on
appeal, that law was ultimately held to be constitutional.479 In fact, only one case found a voter
ID law unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution.480 As for state constitutional challenges to
voter ID laws, three of the four challenged laws were found constitutional.481 Even if plaintiffs
succeeded in showing a burden on voting rights, courts still found the states’ interests in
implementing the law outweighed the burden in a balancing test.482 A state constitutional
challenge, however, was the only case to convince a judge to review the law under the highest

474

Underhill, supra note 325.
N.H. REV. STAT. §659:13 (2017).
476
Id.
477
Id.
478
Id.
479
The Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2008)
480
Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d 627 (S.D. Texas 2014).
481
Democratic Party of Georgia v. Perdue, 288 Ga. 720 (2011); League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Educ.
Network v. Walker, 357 Wis.2d 360 (Wis. 2014); Gentges v. State Election Board, 2018 OK 39 (Okla. 2018).
482
League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Educ. Network v. Walker, 357 Wis.2d 360 (Wis. 2014); Gentges v. State
Election Board, 2018 OK 39 (Okla. 2018).
475

61

level of judicial review, strict scrutiny.483 For both U.S. and state constitution challenges, this
section provides examples of ID laws deemed constitutional and unconstitutional by courts,
noting any themes or unique points in the rationale.
Predating the 2008 U.S. Supreme Court case, Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board,484 a district court in New Mexico provided a pioneering in-depth analysis of a local law
requiring voters required to present a current and valid photo identification card before voting in
person.485 In American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes, residents and voting
organizations sued the Albuquerque city clerk alleging the voter-approved 2005 amendments to
the local Election Code were unconstitutional.486 Santillanes is the only case analyzed where the
plaintiffs raised a separate First Amendment free expression argument from their Fourteenth
Amendment claim.
Under the amendments, local election officials accepted various types of photo and nonphoto IDs.487 If the voter lacked an ID, then the voter completed an affidavit and cast a
provisional ballot.488 As in Crawford, the law mandated the voter return with an ID within ten
days of the election for the ballot to count.489 Finally, the city provided free photo IDs at any
time, even on the day of the election.490
Both sides filed motions for summary judgment, wherein the judge applied the standard
of no genuine issue of material fact based on the pleadings and supporting affidavits, and the
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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.491 At the district court level, the plaintiffs
succeeded with the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim, but the city prevailed in the
alternate First Amendment free expression claims.492
The City argued that the new law advanced its interest in preventing voter fraud.493 The
plaintiffs suggested that the amendment imposed an unconstitutional burden on their right to
vote.494 Specifically, they objected to being subjected to more stringent identification
requirements since they choose to vote in person, rather than absentee voting.495 In addition, the
plaintiffs contended that the amendment is subject to different and arbitrary interpretation by
local election officials based on the vague phrase of “current and valid.”496
First, the judge considered each of the various levels of judicial scrutiny.497 The City
argued that the Court should apply rational-basis scrutiny because plaintiffs failed to present
evidence that the city enacted the new law with an “invidious discriminatory purpose, such as
targeting a ‘suspect class’ of voters.”498 The Court dismissed this argument because the
plaintiff’s prospective challenge to the City’s new photo identification requirement is based on a
threatened injury since they have not yet participated in a municipal election yet.499
The plaintiffs contended that the Court should apply strict scrutiny because the
amendment implicated their fundamental right to vote.500 The defendants countered that strict
scrutiny did not apply because the Constitution does not recognize a “fundamental right” to vote
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in person, as opposed to some other voting method such as absentee voting.501 The defendants
analogized to Bush v. Gore wherein the Supreme Court declared, “[t]he individual citizen has no
federal constitutional right to vote for electors…unless and until the state legislature chooses a
statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members to the Electoral
College.”502 The Court disagreed with the City.503 Instead, the court asserted that the Supreme
Court’s recognition of voting as a fundamental right does not hinge on whether the Constitution
itself mandates the city to allow citizens to vote in person at a polling place.504 The Court did still
recognize the fundamental right to vote, even when the source of that right lies in state or local
law.505 The court added the right to vote is more than the initial grant of the right, and so equal
protection claims may also arise surrounding the logistical exercise of the right.506
On the other hand, the court followed the precedent from Burdick v. Takushi by not
automatically applying strict scrutiny to the claims.507 In Burdick, the Supreme Court mandated
that a court determine the appropriate level of scrutiny based on the severity of the burden that
the challenged law imposes on the right to vote.508 Thus, to leave sufficient room for state and
local government to orderly administer elections, recent precedent applies an intermediate level
of scrutiny, which provides a flexible standard for reviewing constitutional claims to election
laws.509
Applying the Burdick balancing test concerning the Equal Protection claim, the first step
is to “ascertain ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury of the rights protected by the
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First and Fourteenth Amendments.’”510 The court focused on the claims asserting arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement of the law among similarly situated in-person voters.511 The judge
gave less emphasis to the more stringent identification required for in-person compared with
absentee voting because the court acknowledged the practical differences required for each
voting method.512
On the arbitrary enforcement claim, the new law did not set criteria for what qualified as
“current” or “valid” identification cards.513 Based on the deposition testimony of the City Clerk,
defendant Millie Santillanes, she said that each election judge, or precinct worker, made this
determination.514 The court drew Equal Protection reasoning from early voting-rights cases.515
Under more similar facts in 2006, Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, a district court
reasoned that Georgia’s photo identification law imposed an undue burden on the right to vote
for voters who lacked the necessary requisite identification.516 Plus, the court found that these
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voters would have insufficient time and resources to learn about this new requirement and make
necessary arrangements before the next election.517
Comparing Billups to the present case, the Santillanes district court found the plaintiffs
had more time than Georgia voters to prepare for the next election, but showed fewer efforts to
educate city voters of new voting requirements.518 Therefore, the court concluded that the 2005
amendment imposed a significant burden on the right to vote.519 Plaintiff showed that confusion
about the photo ID requirement was likely to result and could disenfranchise many voters.520
Since the law significantly impaired voting rights, the burden of proof shifted to the City
to show the voting obstacle was narrowly tailored to meet the government interest served.521 The
City claimed that preventing voter impersonation was the precise reasoning for initiating the
identification requirement.522 The court, however, found the amendment said nothing about fraud
or irregularities in voter registration or absentee voting.523 Further, the City put forth no
admissible evidence of voter impersonation fraud in past municipal elections and only provided
one alleged instance of voter impersonation that occurred in the 2004 presidential election.524
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Another strike against the City was the exception made for absentee voters.525 Defendants
asserted that in-person and absentee voters were not similarly situated groups for an Equal
Protection claim.526 While not disputing this fact, the court determined that the absentee voter
exception undermined the City’s argument that the goal was to prevent future cases of voter
impersonation.527
Finally, the court found the law aimed at preventing voter fraud at the polls seemed to
lack stringency when issuing city-issued ID cards.528 Under this new law, Albuquerque residents
are required to show a current and valid photo ID to cast a ballot in-person.529 Even for voters
lacking an ID must provide their date of birth and the last four digits of their Social Security
number to cast a provisional ballot, and then return to the City Clerk's office with an ID card
within ten days the election for the ballot to count.530 In contrast, to obtain a city-issued photo ID
card, the city only required a person to provide one’s name and to attest they were unable to
provide the listed identification documents under the penalty of perjury.531 Thus, the court
concluded that the 2005 amendment lacked a “plausible, close-fitting relationship” to preventing
voter fraud and less restrictive alternatives were available.532 Thus, the amendment violated the
Equal Protection Clause.533
The plaintiff’s primary First Amendment claims relied on the “void for vagueness”
doctrine because the law provided no clear definition of what criteria make a photo ID “current”
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and “valid.”534 Citing NAACP v. Button, the plaintiffs explained that an impermissibly vague law
under the First Amendment tends to have a chilling effect on the exercise of constitutionally
protected expression.535 The plaintiffs argued that when voting, they engaged in core political
speech as a symbolic gesture like assembling for a protest or waving a picket sign.536 The
plaintiffs asserted that by appearing in-person to exercise the franchise, they conveyed a public
message to the community about the importance of democracy under First Amendment theory.537
The court found that the plaintiff’s First Amendment theory-based argument conflated
voting in a non-public forum with core political speech that takes place in a traditional public
forum.538 The court noted that the Supreme Court has recognized that it is necessary to restrict
speech in non-public forums to protect the right to vote.539 For example, in Burson v. Freeman, a
plurality of the Supreme Court upheld a Tennessee law that prohibited soliciting votes or
displaying campaign materials within 100 feet of polling place entrances.540 The rationale for the
Burson decision was that although the Tennessee law presented an impediment to exercising the
fundamental right to vote, the State had a sufficiently compelling interest in prohibiting
expression to protect the right to vote.541
Also, since people vote secretly in a protected booth, the Santillanes district court
questioned whether voting sends the symbolic message to community members that the plaintiffs
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claimed.542 The Santillanes court suggested that if plaintiffs wanted to make a public statement
along with exercising the franchise, then they should hold a demonstration in a traditional public
forum, such as a sidewalk or street the appropriate number of feet from their polling place.543
Thus, the ID requirement placed no burden on plaintiff’s public demonstration ability.544
The Santillanes district court held that the plaintiffs did not need to rely on a separate and
distinct First Amendment theory to justify a heightened level of judicial scrutiny.545 The “void
for vagueness” doctrine was not limited to just their First Amendment claim, and plaintiffs could
also raise the issue within their Equal Protection claim.546 Therefore, the court granted summary
judgment for the City concerning the Plaintiff’s First Amendment “void for vagueness” claim.547
After the district court handed down Santillanes, but before oral arguments on appeal at
the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court handed down the Crawford decision, which upheld the
similarly crafted Indiana photo ID law against a facial equal protection challenge and created
binding precedent for federal courts nationwide.548 The Tenth Circuit appellate court reviewed
the Santillanes court’s grant of summary judgment on the equal protection claim de novo, with
no deference given to the lower court.549 The City asserted several errors on appeal, including
that the voting law properly distinguished between in-person and absentee voters, the district
court improperly applied heightened judicial scrutiny, and the photo ID law was not
unconstitutionally vague.550 The Tenth Circuit reviewed each in turn.551

542

Id. at 643.
Id.
544
Id.
545
Id.
546
Id.
547
Id.
548
The Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d at 1316-17. See Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
549
The Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d at 1317.
550
Id. at 1317.
551
Id.
543

69

First, the plaintiffs contended on appeal that the law created an arbitrary distinction
between in-person and absentee voters since any Albuquerque voter may choose to vote absentee
and not present an ID.552 Further, the plaintiffs argued that the greater opportunity to absentee
vote increased the chances for “mischief” and created a greater need to treat all voters alike.553
This argument did not persuade the Tenth Circuit since the appeals court stated that absentee
voting fundamentally differs from in-person voting with its own set of governing procedures.554
Second, after a lengthy discussion of the various levels of judicial scrutiny, the district
court had applied intermediate scrutiny as established in Burdick.555 The first prong of the
balancing test is to identify the alleged infringement on the right to vote.556 The lower court
inappropriately focused on the city’s failure to educate voters about the law and found its
application would be confusing.557 The appellate court found that in the absence of any
indication of voter confusion, the law cannot be invalidated based on lack of education alone.558
The court stated, “Our task is not to mandate a perfect system-just one that meets
constitutional requirements.”559 In Crawford, the Supreme Court concluded that the burdens
imposed by the photo ID law did not substantially burden the right to vote.560 The Court went on
to provide the following examples to illustrate the minimal burden of the law:
[A] voter may lose his photo identification, may have his wallet stolen on the way
to the polls, or may not resemble the photo in the identification because he recently
grew a beard. Burdens of that sort arising out of life's vagaries, however, are neither
so serious nor so frequent as to raise any question about the constitutionality of [the
photo identification law].561
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The second prong of the Burdick balance test required the court to balance the burdens imposed
against the state’s justifications for the law.562 While the lower court required the City to present
evidence of specific instances of voter fraud, the appellate court held this to be too high a burden
on the City because the Supreme Court did not require Indiana to do so in Crawford.563
Finally, the Santillanes district court held the amendment to be vague because it left
defining the meanings of “current” and “valid” to the discretion of local election judges.564 The
Tenth Circuit court examined the text of the amendment, including its non-exclusive list of
acceptable identifications, including government-issued identification, student identification
cards, credit or debit cards, insurance cards, union cards, and professional association cards
without requiring cards include an address or expiration date.565 Thus, the appeals court found
the law to be even less restrictive than the Indiana law requiring an expiration date, which was
upheld by the Supreme Court in Crawford.566 Further, the Tenth Circuit found the words
“current” and “valid” not to be vague because the federal HAVA statute uses those terms for all
first-time voters in federal elections to present a “current and valid photo identification.”567
Texas’s voter ID law has been mired in litigation since its inception.568 In Veasey v.
Perry, a group of plaintiffs immediately challenged S.B. 14 under the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, alleging the law denied free speech and free association through voting and
participation in elections.569 They argued that strict scrutiny ought to be applied to analyze the
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law.570 The Texas district court stated that an individual’s right to vote is implied in the First
Amendment and protected as fundamental by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and
Equal Protection clauses.571 Specifically, an equal protection claim applies either when a state
“classifies voters in disparate ways, or places restrictions on the right to vote.”572 As did the
district court in Santillanes, the Veasey district court applied intermediate scrutiny and balanced
the burden on the plaintiff’s right to vote against the legitimacy of the State’s interests and the
extent those state interests required imposing these burdens on the franchise.573
Before S.B. 14 went into effect, the only document required for a voter to cast a ballot
was their voter registration certificate, which did not include a photograph.574 Then, the court
explains the challenged provisions of S.B. 14, effective on January 1, 2012, which dictated the
only acceptable forms of ID were a driver’s license, state-issued ID, concealed carry permit,
military ID, citizenship certificate, or U.S. passport.575 If a voter lacks an ID, then the person
may obtain an election identification certificate from the Department of Public Safety upon
presenting satisfactory proof of identity.576 The court included a chart illustrating the acceptable
forms of identification in Texas compared with other states to illustrate how comparatively S.B.
14 is among the strictest in the nation.577
The State filed a motion to dismiss on various grounds, including that the Supreme Court
automatically approved voter ID laws in two prior cases, Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of
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Arizona, Inc. and Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.578 In denying the state’s motion at
a preliminary hearing, the district court judge, Nelva Gonzales Ramos, found Texas overstated
the Supreme Court’s approval of ID laws.579 Then, in a rare U.S. Constitutional challenge, the
Veasey plaintiffs successfully produced sufficient evidence at trial to show the law significantly
burdened voting rights. First, the district court again with Judge Ramos presiding described the
state’s history of racial disparity in voting.580 Second, using legislative history, plaintiffs showed
S.B. 14 was the Texas Legislature’s fourth, increasingly strict attempt to enact a voter ID law.581
The State proffered two rationales for the increasing strictness of the law.582 First, since
the 2010 U.S. Census revealed a large increase in the Hispanic population in Texas, the
proponents identified preventing voter fraud as a priority.583 In 2011, proponents focused on
proposed legislation addressing the dangers of illegal immigration, including redistricting,
eliminating sanctuary cities, speaking English-only, and rolling back provisions of the
Affordable Care Act.584 Another rationale offered was increasing public confidence in elections
and voter turnout.585 The State, however, provided no evidence to support any of the following
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claims: (a) voter turnout was low due to lack of confidence in elections, (b) a voter ID law
would increase confidence, or (c) increased election confidence would increase voter turnout.586
Instead, the evidence showed that S.B. 14’s discriminatory effect for various reasons.587
First, the law specifically burdened Texans living in poverty, who are less likely to possess a
qualified ID or be able to obtain one and more likely to be African Americans and Hispanic
voters.588 Relatedly, African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to live in poverty due to
systemic barriers caused by decades of racial discrimination.589
The State argued that none of the individual plaintiffs would be disenfranchised or
substantially burdened because those over age 65 and the disabled can vote by mail.590 The court
found, however, the evidence indicated that the absentee ballot system is not an appropriate
alternative because a greater risk of voter fraud exists.591 For example, campaign workers could
harvest mail-in ballots by raiding mailboxes.592 The court heard testimony from many people
who prefer to vote in-person because they distrust mail-in ballots.593 Especially within the
African American community, in-person voting is a celebration of overcoming suffrage obstacles
and implicitly evoking the free expression values of individual autonomy and self-realization.594
Second, the State suggested that any remaining plaintiffs can get a free qualified ID, but
choose not to do so. The court chastised the state for failing to appreciate the realities of those
living in poverty who are unable to pay costs associated with traveling and obtaining a “free”
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qualified ID.595 The court said, “The poor should not be denied the right to vote because they
have chosen to spend their money to feed their family.”596
The district court also had to align the results of the case with existing jurisprudence,
including Crawford and Frank v. Walker, wherein the Seventh Circuit upheld Wisconsin’s ID
law that is similar to the Texas S.B. 14.597 The Frank trial court struck down the Wisconsin law
because the court found the state’s interests in preventing fraud and restoring public confidence
to be weak.598 The judge balanced the state’s weak justifications against the same voting burdens
placed upon Texas voters, which included understanding the requirements, obtaining supporting
documents, traveling between residences and offices that issue election IDs, and possibly a lack
of transportation.599 The Frank court found enough voters could be potentially disenfranchised to
sway elections.600 Judge Lynn Adelman permanently enjoined the law, but on appeal, the
Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court and upheld the law citing Crawford.601
Agreeing with the Frank trial court reasoning, the Veasey district court distinguished
their facts from the Frank and Crawford cases.602 First, the Texas plaintiffs presented evidence
of attempts to overcome the obstacles required to obtain an election ID, such as finding a local
office.603 Next, the plaintiffs presented evidence of the cost to obtain the necessary documents to
obtain a state-issued ID.604 Third, the record contained historical evidence of discrimination in
Texas and the extraordinary efforts of the Texas Legislature to pass S.B. 14.605 Finally, the
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Supreme Court holding in Crawford’s facial challenge left open the possibility for the plaintiffs
to bring a successful as-applied challenged to S.B. 14.606
The Veasey district court found that the plaintiffs sustained their legal burden of showing
a violation of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights because S.B. 14 substantially burdened the
franchise, and the State failed to offset these burdens with an evidence-based justification.607 The
court stated, “It is too easy to think that everyone ought to have a photo ID when so many do, but
the right to vote of good citizens of the State of Texas should not be substantially burdened
simply because the hurdles might appear to be low.”608 As did the Frank lower court, the court
issued a permanent injunction of the law and mandated Texas return to its prior ID provisions.609
State Constitutional Challenges
Amongst the state constitutional challenges, most courts under the Burdick balancing test
found either the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving impairment of voting rights or
state interests outweighed any burden on voting.610 Predating Crawford, the Georgia legislature
passed the 2005 Photo ID Act regarding acceptable identification for in-person voting to protect
against fraud.611 The law required registered voters in Georgia who vote in person to show one of
six forms of government issued photo ID.612 If the voter lacked an ID, then the vote affirmed
their identity and cast a provisional ballot.613 More stringent than Crawford, the law mandated
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the voter return with an ID within two days of the election for the ballot to count.614 Finally, the
city only provided photo voter IDs for a fee.615
This case began when plaintiffs challenged the 2006 Act based upon violations to
Georgia’s Constitution, including Article II, Section I, Paragraphs II616 and III617 as an
unauthorized qualification on the fundamental right to vote and denying equal protection of the
law under Georgia’s Equal Protection Clause.618 The trial court found the 2006 law violated
none of these provisions and granted summary judgment in favor of the State.619
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia evaluated each claim in turn.620 First, regarding
the undue burden on the right to vote, the plaintiffs alleged that the Georgia Constitution
expressly states the qualifications to vote, and this list is exclusive.621 The court dismissed this
argument stating the Act does not affect voter registration, which requires no photo
identification.622 The Act also does not impose a condition on voting because registered voters
may choose a method of voting that requires no photo ID.623 Finally, the requirement is not an
impermissible qualification on voting either because the 2006 Act does not prevent any voter
from casting a ballot since they may obtain a free photo ID at their county locations.624
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Regarding the equal protection claim, the plaintiffs argued the trial court failed to
independently evaluate their claims under the Georgia Constitution because the state constitution
provides greater protections under its equal protection clause than does the U.S. Constitution.625
Again, the Georgia Supreme Court dismissed this claim because the court has repeatedly stated
that the Georgia clause is “coextensive” and “substantially equivalent” to the federal clause.626
Then applying the Burdick balancing test, which the court called the Anderson balancing
test, 627 the court identified a legitimate state’s interest in eliminating the potential for voter fraud
at the polls.628 The plaintiffs, on the other hand, clearly failed to establish the law burdened
voting rights because they only offered testimony of one voter who did not possess a requisite ID
because of age and physical infirmities, but ultimately voted with an absentee ballot. 629
To mitigate the alleged voting burdens, the state submitted evidence of a comprehensive
education program since 2007 to inform election officials and voters of the new requirements.630
Also, the new law was implemented in 15 elections during 2007 and 2008 without reported
problems.631 Thus, the Georgia Supreme Court found the 2006 Act to impose only a “minimal,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory restriction.”632
Justice Robert Benham began his dissenting opinion by discussing the nation’s extensive
history of denying the franchise to various groups of citizens.633 He acknowledged that while
requiring government-issued photo identification may seem reasonable in the twenty-first
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century, the qualification is quite burdensome on those citizens living at “the margins of our
society (i.e., the poor, infirm, and elderly).”634 Plus, Justice Benham pointed out that cases of
voting fraud have not been proven to occur at any significant rates.635
His main issue was the majority assertion that the 2006 Act does not burden citizens
since they may obtain a voter ID card “free of charge.”636 Benham pointed out that obtaining the
free voter ID card is more burdensome than registering to vote.637 In addition, while absentee
voting may be preferable for the physically immobile, Justice Benham took issue with the
majority presenting it as an option that mitigates all of the difficulties of the in-person photo ID
requirement.638
A challenge to Oklahoma’s ID law presented a rare plaintiff, a single registered voter,
bringing a state constitutional claim in Gentges v. State Election Board in 2018.639 Before the
law, each voter only had to announce his name to the precinct judge to verify the person’s name
in the precinct registry.640 As addressed in Santillanes, Oklahoma voters in 2010 approved the
following Voter ID Act, which required in-person voters to present a government- or tribalissued photo ID containing the voter’s name and an expiration date.641 As an alternative, a person
may present a voter ID card.642 If a person is unable to produce an ID, the state allows the voter
to sign a statement swearing to their identity and cast a provisional ballot.643 The plaintiff brought
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this action against the State Election Board claiming that the law is a condition on the right to
vote in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution.644
The district court found the voter ID law not to violate the state constitution.645 Even with
the mass of evidence below, the district court ruled that the plaintiff failed to meet the burden of
proof that the law impinged unconstitutionally on the free exercise of suffrage rights. 646
Although the plaintiff presented evidence that a quarter of the state’s population lacked a driver’s
license or state-issued ID, the percentage was deemed inaccurate by the court because it did not
subtract the portion of the population under age 18.647 Second, State Senator Judy McIntyre
testified that Oklahoma ranks 44th in the nation regarding people living in poverty.648 McIntyre
noted that transportation is a cost-prohibitive issue for many people living in poverty who are
unable to pay someone to take them to obtain a driver’s license or state ID.649 Finally, the
plaintiff presented statistical evidence showing the insufficiency of provisional ballots as an
alternative.650 For example, in the November 2010 election, voters cast 700 provisional ballots,
but the state ultimately counted only 117.651
On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo, or without
deference to the lower court.652 Assuming the plaintiffs demonstrated a burden on voting rights,
the reviewing court began its analysis by considering the intent of the law.653 The State argued
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that the law was intended to prevent future cases of fraud, even with no evidence provided of
prior in-person voter fraud.654 Accepting the State’s rationale, the court found the Oklahoma law
analogous to the Indiana law in Crawford.655 Based on the State's attempt to prevent voter fraud
as outweighing any burden on voting rights, the Oklahoma Supreme Court declared the lack of
evidence of in-person fraud in the state was not a barrier to reasonable preventative legislation.656
Then, the court used Crawford as a baseline for deciding the case and engaged in a pointby-point comparison between the Oklahoma and Indiana law to show the Oklahoma law is not as
harsh as the previously-approved Indiana law.657 While Oklahoma does not provide free photo
identification cards for voters as Indiana does, the state does provide free paper voter ID cards,
which voters may use in lieu of a photo ID.658 Also, a voter with no identification can vote by
provisional ballot at a polling location with no further trips required.659 In contrast, Indiana
voters are required to make a second trip to prove their identity before the circuit court clerk
within ten days of the election.660 Since the Oklahoma Voter ID Act selected provisions appeared
less stringent than Indiana, the law procedurally ensures voters meet exiting qualifications, and
the court found no direct cost to vote, the state Supreme Court considered it constitutional.661
Finally, Pennsylvania’s law presented the lone constitutional challenge wherein a court
subjected a voter ID law to strict scrutiny. In October 2012, plaintiffs challenged Pennsylvania’s
Act 18 requirement of an acceptable form of photo identification containing a name, photograph,
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and expiration date for in-person voting.662 In Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
among their arguments, plaintiffs alleged that the law would disenfranchise or deter qualified
voters from exercising their fundamental right to vote.663 The Pennsylvania Constitution
explicitly provides the right to vote in Article I, Section 5.664
Before enactment of the ID law, the only photo ID requirements applied to first-time
voters as per the federal Help America Vote Act, which sets voting requirements for federal
elections.665 As an alternative to a photo ID, prior law allowed voters to present one of several
forms of non-photo ID containing their names and addresses, such as a utility bill.666
Act 18 also provided for a list of acceptable “alternate IDs” available for voting,
including student IDs, care facility IDs, and military IDS.667 Voters could also obtain a secure,
non-driver ID without a fee from a Department of Transportation office.668 Since the state
deemed the ID as secure, lots of supporting documents were required, and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court declared the ID did not allow for liberal voter access compelled by the statute.669
To address the ruling, Pennsylvania created the Department of State ID, or DOS ID,
which is valid for ten years and used only for voting.670 Unlike the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation ID, the only supporting documents required for the DOS ID are that an applicant
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completes an application with their social security number and signs an affirmation form.671 The
Department of State then confirms the applicant is a registered voter in the statewide database.672
Initially, the Commonwealth Court, analogous to a state appellate court, denied the
plaintiffs’ request to enjoin the state law for the November election.673 The Court explained that
a citizen’s “equal right to vote” is not absolute, but competes with the state’s interest in
preserving the integrity of its elections.674 Then, employing the federal “flexible” Burdick
balancing standard as discussed in Crawford, the court reached the same conclusion the U.S.
Supreme Court did on the similar Indiana law.675 The court found the photo ID requirement to be
a reasonable, non-discriminatory, and non-severe burden on the franchise given the broad
context of photo ID usage in daily life.676 Also, the court deemed the State’s interest in protecting
public trust in elections legitimately sufficient to outweigh the burden on individual rights.677
Upon appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the lower court ruling was vacated and
remanded.678 The majority opinion agreed with the plaintiffs that the statute seemed to violate
constitutional norms in the short term.679 The court added that the current facial challenge might
be sustainable even if the State may validly enforce the statute in the long-term.680
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On remand, a different district judge, Judge Bernard McGinley, granted the preliminary
injunction and enjoined enforcing the ID law for the 2012 Presidential election.681 This time, the
Commonwealth Court explained that a law is facially unconstitutional when “a ‘substantial
number’ of its applications are unconstitutional, ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly
legitimate sweep.’”682 The Court finds Act 18 failed to pass the facial challenge test because the
State failed to provide a compliant photo ID for all qualified electors.683 The court says, “Like a
house of cards, everything rises and falls upon the legitimacy of the DOS ID.”684 The court
added the Department of State ID is an unauthorized agency creation that is difficult to obtain.685
The Commonwealth Court found the voter ID law violated the fundamental state
constitutional right to vote.686 The court cited Pennsylvania precedent that forbids regulating the
right to vote when the law denies the franchise, or “make[s] it so difficult as to amount to a
denial.”687 Thousands of Pennsylvania electors lack a compliant photo ID, and the alternate IDs
do not remedy this situation since Department of State IDs are only available to registered
electors, not all qualified voters.688 Also, the State subjects voters to additional burdens in
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obtaining a Department of State ID at limited locations, during limited times, and run the risk of
improper denial due to database issues.689
To provide context for the subjectivity of judges’ views on the availability of a free ID
option, an Alabama district court in 2018 found the availability of a free ID to mitigate any
burdens on voting rights.690 The court stated that these IDs are available during regular business
hours at various locations, including Secretary Merrill’s office at the Capitol, any county Board
of Registrar’s Office, or wherever the Secretary’s mobile ID unit is visiting on a given day. 691
Moreover, the court held that “the individual plaintiffs’ situations demonstrate that people who
want a photo ID can get one.”692 Finally, Judge Scott Coogler viewed the voter ID law by stating,
“The impact of the law should not be measured by how many people lack a given ID at a given
point in time, but by whether someone without an ID can easily get one.”693
Given the magnitude of these burdens implemented for the first-time on Pennsylvania
voters, Applewhite provides a rare example wherein a court subjected the ID law to strict
scrutiny.694 Under this level of analysis, the state first bears the burden of proof at showing a
compelling state interest in implementing the law in the upcoming election.695 The state
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identified election integrity and ensuring public confidence in the election system as the state
interest.696 Although Crawford acknowledged these as important interests, Pennsylvania did not
support these interests in implementing the voter ID law with evidence.697
Under the second prong of strict scrutiny, the state also had to show the law was narrowly
tailored to meet the state interest of maintaining election integrity.698 Given prior elections
accepted various types of ID, the burdens of the new ID law appeared unnecessary and not
narrowly tailored.699 The court also found the law to unreasonably restrict the acceptable forms
of photo IDs.700 For example, employee IDs for school districts, welfare cards, bus passes with a
picture, gun permits, and drivers’ licenses from another state were all deemed unacceptable.701
The court found the few accepted alternate IDs not to be “a sufficient bandage” to repair
the obstacles of the voter ID law since the state only accepts IDs from discrete groups, such as
the elderly and college students.702 Further, many university student IDs do not comply because
they lack an expiration date, and many long-term care facilities do not issue photo IDs.703
Also, the State claimed the Department of State ID provides for liberal access to an
acceptable ID.704 Since this option is only available to registered voters, unlike in other states,
Pennsylvania failed to provide a “safety net” for other qualified voters to access a ballot.705 The
court highlighted options from other states, such as Kansas and Georgia allowing voters to
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present expired drivers’ licenses.706 Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, and Wisconsin have allowed voters to present student IDs without an expiration
date.707 Even Indiana has allowed voters to affirm they are registered voters at their polling place
and cast a ballot based only on their affirmation to prevent disenfranchisement.708 The court
found that Act 18 unconstitutionally disenfranchised thousands of qualified voters who lacked a
compliant photo ID and violated the state constitution’s fundamental right to vote.709
In conclusion, the Santillanes plaintiffs argued an inherent First Amendment interest
exists with exercising the franchise in front of their peers, echoed by dissenting opinions.710 In
Veasey, a district court striking down Texas’s ID law, recognized the mistrust of alternative
modes of voting for historically disenfranchised groups, like African Americans.711 The Veasey
judge even quotes Reverend Johnson’s testimony about how many African Americans celebrate
voting as part of their “freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of speech,”
and implying that in-person voting evokes the individual autonomy and self-realization values.712
Two cases, however, found that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof, such as
the testimony of one lone voter in Perdue.713 Alternatively, three courts found that the states’
interests in preventing fraud and protecting election integrity were sufficient to justify any
burden on voting rights without requiring proof of how the laws promoted these interests.714
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Finally, in Applewhite, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court subjected the ID law to strict scrutiny.715
As noted in the Conclusion, strict scrutiny is not always fatal to a state ID law, but requires states
to provide good-faith reasons for not accepting specific types of ID.716
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CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This thesis found few examples in which courts explicitly used First Amendment
rationales and any associated free expression values when addressing voter ID laws. More
commonly, courts applied the Burdick balancing test for upholding the ID law and identified two
common rationales: either the plaintiff did not meet their burden of proof or the state interests
outweighed any burden on voting rights. A few courts even engaged in comparative analysis
between state laws as a justification for upholding certain laws. This thesis, however,
recommends that courts review all voter ID laws under a strict scrutiny analytical framework, as
the court did in Applewhite.717 The “narrowly tailored” prong requires states to justify deeming
certain types of identification as unacceptable.718
Out of the seven cases analyzed, three presented U.S. Constitutional challenges and four
were based on state constitutional challenges. Of the three U.S. Constitutional challenges, courts
deemed two voter ID laws constitutional.719 The district court in the southern district of Texas in
Veasey v. Perry, however, declared Texas’ law unconstitutionally violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.720 Of the four state constitutional challenges, courts deemed three laws
constitutional.721 Only a district court struck down the Pennsylvania law as unconstitutionally
burdening the state’s explicit provision providing a fundamental right to vote.722
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Regarding research question one, only a single court opinion analyzed for this thesis
analyzed whether a voter ID law infringed on First Amendment free expression as a separate
claim from the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. In Santillanes, a district court
opinion that predates Crawford, the ACLU of New Mexico, unsuccessfully argued that voters
engaged in “core political speech” when they go to the polls to exercise the franchise in front of
their peers.723 They argued that voting was a symbolic gesture like waving a picket sign in the
street, which conveys a public message about the importance of democracy or representative
government.724 This argument implicitly invokes Meiklejohn’s self-governance value, a societal
value for free expression.725 The Court, however, found that the plaintiffs conflated voting with
“core political speech” in a traditional public forum.726 The Supreme Court has long held that
polling places are a limited public forum where states may place reasonable restrictions to
protect voting.727
Relating back research question two, the opinions do not explicitly discuss any societal
expression values when addressing challenges to voter identification laws. One court, the Veasey
v. Perry district court, however, implicitly evoked the individual values of autonomy and selfrealization.728 The district court elaborately described Texas’s history concerning racial disparity
in voting.729 The judge even quotes Reverend Johnson’s testimony attesting to how many
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African Americans celebrated voting as part of their “freedom of expression, freedom of
association, and freedom of speech.”730
Regarding Emerson’s description of autonomy,731 black people fought throughout history
to be able to express their ideas at the ballot box, without fear of censorship.732 As previously
discussed in the literature, Emerson articulated four key values of freedom of expression in The
System of Freedom of Expression.733 Emerson’s four values include: 1) encouraging selfrealization, 2) attaining truth, 3) participating in political decision-making, and 4) promoting
orderly change within society.734 The fight of African Americans to obtain the vote and the
ability to exercise the franchise freely allows fulfillment of these values.735
Relating to Baker’s self-realization value, Texas’ history of voter discrimination violates
the principle of “dignity and equal worth” of individual members of the community.736 Baker
advocated for a broad “liberty model,” or system of individual free expression.737 Baker’s model
required the community to respect “the dignity and equal worth” of individual members, which
could be applied to provide equal access to the ballot box.738
More often, the five court opinions upholding voter ID laws followed Crawford’s
mandate and applied the Burdick balancing test. Two lines of themes exist in the rationales for
upholding the laws. Either the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate a
significant burden on voting rights, or given the burden on voting rights, the state justifications
for the law outweighed the individual burdens.
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The plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof in two of the five cases, Perdue and
Greater Birmingham Ministries.739 From these cases, the researcher noted what insufficient
proof of burdening voting rights and what sufficient proof has been considered. First, in Perdue,
the judge discounted the testimony of one voter with disabilities who ultimately voted with an
absentee ballot.740 The Georgia Supreme Court also found the burden of the law mitigated by the
state’s education efforts and the duration the law had been in effect.741
Second, an Oklahoma district court did not accept statistics about the percentage of the
population lacking required photo ID without properly identifying impacts on specific
demographic subgroups.742 The Oklahoma court also did not rely on only expert testimony about
how transportation costs are cost-prohibitive for individuals living in poverty or the insufficiency
of alternative voting methods.743 Instead, the court preferred actual, individual accounts of voter
hardship. Finally, an Alabama district court ruled a state’s history of voter discrimination
standing alone as insufficient to show a burden on voting rights.744
On the other hand, Veasey v. Perry, is the only case that successfully challenged a law
under the U.S. Constitution under the Burdick balancing test.745 To demonstrate a burden on
voting rights, the plaintiffs provided a wealth of evidence, including historical evidence of
Texas’ pattern of voter discrimination along with specific legislative history surrounding the
voter ID law itself.746 For example, this was the Texas legislature’s fourth attempt at passing an
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ID law, and each time, the bill was increasingly strict.747 Also, the plaintiffs presented testimony
from actual voters who tried to overcome the obstacles of the law to obtain an ID and failed,
along with the associated specific costs of obtaining the supporting documents for a state-ID.748
Even when plaintiffs demonstrated a burden on voting rights, three of the five cases ruled
that state justifications for ID laws outweighed the burden on voting rights.749 Citing Crawford,
the Santillanes, League of Women Voters, and Gentges courts stated that preventing voter fraud,
modernizing election procedures, and restoring public trust in elections were sufficiently
important reasons to justify burdening voting rights.750 Even given Alabama’s documented
history of voter discrimination, Judge Scott Coogler found in Merrill further support for the law
by stating that Alabama did not act on its own in enacting an ID law, but just joined in a growing
national trend.751 Overall, courts were deferential to the alleged state interests for enacting ID
laws. The 2018 Gentges district court best expressed this deference to combatting voter fraud,
“While there is no evidence of prior in-person voter fraud in Oklahoma, the Voter ID Act was
intended as a procedural regulation to prevent future in-person voter fraud.”752 The lack of
evidence was not a barrier to reasonable preventative legislation.753
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The reasoning of these courts, however, contradicts recent literature regarding voter
fraud. In fact, in an article published in the Harvard Law Review the same week as the Crawford
decision,754 A Harvard government professor, Stephen Ansolabehere, and a Stanford law
professor, Nathaniel Persily, found that a large share of the public perceived voter impersonation
occurs very often (9 percent) or somewhat often (32 percent).755 On the other hand, respondents
who perceive greater voter fraud are no less likely to turn out to vote.756 The researchers also did
not observe any difference in perceptions of fraud based on whether the respondent lived in a
state with a strict voter law or not.757 Regardless, Crawford continues as the reigning precedent
for the next generation of ID laws, such as requiring proof of citizenship to combat noncitizen
voting.758
In response to research question three, cases analyzed under state constitutions had more
explicit provisions for plaintiffs to argue the right to vote was a fundamental right.759 In
Applewhite, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held elections are “free and equal” under the state
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constitution when elections are public and open to all qualified electors alike.760 Similarly, the
dissenting opinion in League of Women Voters v. Walker declared that the right to vote was “a
sacred right of the highest character.”761 Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Shirley Abrahamson
added that the state explicitly confers the right to vote upon all qualified individuals in Article
III, Section 1 of the state constitution.762
The state constitutional challenges also provided courts with greater justification for
analyzing ID laws under the highest level of judicial scrutiny, strict scrutiny. In Applewhite, the
district court hinged assessing the burden of the law on the availability of a free state-issued
ID.763 The court found the ID was only available to registered electors, not all qualified ones, and
that the state only offered the ID at limited times and locations.764 Thus, the court found the law
imposed a severe burden on the right to vote and thus invoked strict scrutiny.765 This same
argument failed in a U.S. Constitutional challenge because, in Greater Birmingham Ministries,
the court found that the free state-issued ID mitigated any burden on individual voting rights.766
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the burden shifts to the government to show both a
compelling state interest for the law and the law is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.767
While citing Crawford and acknowledging preventing fraud and protecting the integrity of
elections as important state interests, the Applewhite district court on remand required evidence
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of how the law promoted these interests.768 In contrast, the Santillanes, League of Women Voters,
and Gentges courts applied lower levels of judicial scrutiny and readily accepted the state
interests without demanding documentation. Thus, a professor of law, Joshua Douglas, said that
a state would only lose an election law case on this prong of strict scrutiny if the state fails to
support with evidence that the law combats voter fraud or promotes election integrity.769
Strict scrutiny also required the state to show the law was narrowly tailored to promote
the compelling state interest.770 Although the Supreme Court has not provided a detailed
discussion of the narrowly tailored prong in election law cases, the Applewhite district court
analysis provides an example since this prong was at the “meat” of the controversy.771 The court
found the state failed to justify the law as narrowly tailored because the state deemed various
forms of ID, such as employee IDs, welfare cards, and bus passes with photos, as
unacceptable.772
Professor Douglas explained that narrow tailoring does not require the state to exhaust
every conceivable alternative form of ID, but does mandate a good faith consideration of
workable alternatives.773 The court added that narrow tailoring does mandate weighing the costs
and benefits of accepting certain types of ID with any practical alternatives.774 In Applewhite,
Pennsylvania never explained why the above forms of ID were deemed unacceptable.775 While
strict scrutiny has given plaintiffs the highest chances of success, the literature states that if
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courts reviewed all election law challenges under strict scrutiny and gave states “a limited degree
of leeway” to regulate elections, many of the decisions would yield the same result.776
Professor Peter Rubin described three purposes served by the narrowly tailored
analysis.777 First, this prong ensures the stated purpose of the law matches the actual purpose and
“smoke[s] out” any illegitimate purposes.778 Second, this analysis checks stereotyped thinking
and biases.779 Third, even when some genuine distinction exists between two groups, this inquiry
assures that the distinction will only be used to the degree necessary for achieving the
government purpose.780
Another trend in cases, like Gentges v. State Election Board, is where the court initially
engaged in the prescribed Burdick balancing test and then reinforced upholding the law with a
point-by-point relative comparison of select provisions of the Indiana ID law approved in
Crawford.781 In upholding the Oklahoma law, the court found that although Oklahoma did not
provide a free photo ID, the state did provide a free voter ID card that voters could use at the
polls.782 Also, if an Oklahoma voter showed up without an ID, the law permitted the voter to cast
a provisional ballot without any subsequent trips to verify identification.783 Since the law was
found to be less strict than the Indiana law, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the law.784 In
contrast, when the district court struck down Pennsylvania’s law in Applewhite, the court found
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the state failed to provide a “safety net” for qualified voters who lacked even a free state ID, such
as states like Kansas and Georgia that allow voters to use expired driver’s license to vote.785
When the Supreme Court in Crawford examined the nuances of the Indiana law, they had
little other evidence in the record than just the provisions of the ID law. In fact, Justice Scalia
warned in his concurring opinion that the lead opinion’s record-based resolution of the case
provides no certainty for future cases.786 Case certainty, however, is not the only consideration.
Since election law is a state power, Burdick dictates that courts balance both the burden on
voters’ rights and the state interests in each case with record-based evidence on both sides.
Scholarship presents Crawford as dictating to lower courts that their primary job will be to carve
out exceptions for disadvantaged individuals and groups by voting laws.787 Courts have a
governmental obligation to serve as a voice for oppressed minority voters and should avoid
engaging in a relative comparative analysis with other states.
While most voter identification law opinions analyzed for this thesis engaged in the
Burdick balancing test as prescribed in the Crawford decision, they are inconsistent in their
approach.788 The opinions identify the subgroups affected by a given law, and most judges have
required actual evidence of hardship. As discussed earlier in Veasey v. Perry, plaintiffs should
err on the side of providing the court with a variety of specific information about the burdens of
the voting law and actual testimony of disenfranchised voters.789 As the appellate court stated in
Santillanes when rejecting the lower court’s conjectural instances of voter disenfranchisement,
“The court deals in probabilities, not possibilities.”790 Relative comparisons between states
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minimize the burdens experienced by voters because types of accepted ID can vary greatly from
state to state, and each ID not accepted can impact a unique subset of that state’s population.
Then, judges decide whether this burden on voting rights is substantial or not.
On the other hand, most courts readily accepted the state’s interests of preventing voter
fraud and improving elections integrity as legitimate state interests without requiring any further
evidentiary support. Without adequate evidence on the other side of the equation, the cases used
varying levels of judicial scrutiny in cases with similar facts. Two ID cases stated they were
applying intermediate scrutiny, and only one applied strict scrutiny.791 Although the other four
cases did not explicitly state the level of scrutiny applied, the courts analyzed each law with great
deference to the state alleged interests.792
Since courts have no predetermined test for determining a standard of review, Justice
Breyer recommended a test in his dissent in Crawford.793 Breyer stated that a severe burden on
voting rights and a weak threat of fraud justifies heightened or strict scrutiny.794 As stated earlier,
plaintiffs have a better chance of proving a severe burden on voting rights if the state constitution
explicitly provides a fundamental right to vote.795
Breyer added that less extreme cases call for some form of intermediate scrutiny,
requiring the state to show its statute substantially relates to an important government interest.796
Here, most courts tend to conflate facial challenges, as in Crawford, where the law can only be
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struck down if it is unconstitutional in all of its applications with the as-applied standard, which
depends on a plaintiff’s unique circumstances.797 On a facial challenge, the standard is very high
for plaintiffs to show the law is unconstitutional in all applications, so the Court accepted
government interests of preventing voter fraud and protecting election integrity without more. 798
Of all the cases analyzed, only two applied intermediate scrutiny, and only the district court in
Santillanes required evidence of voter impersonation and fraud.799 That court stated the city put
forth no past allegations of voter fraud in municipal elections and only one alleged instance in
the 2004 presidential election, which the court deemed insufficient and struck down the law.800
Since the Indiana law was not yet in effect, the Crawford court indicated that the law
should be upheld on its face because the true extent of the constitutional burden remained
unknown at the time of litigation.801 The Court added, when the burden of the law could be better
understood, a proper as-applied challenge may lie.802 Now, as more of these laws have been in
effect in 34 states, voter ID laws disenfranchise voters in each election, which is a constitutional
injury, and as-applied cases are now ripe.803 For courts to properly assess the burden on unique
subsets of the voter population, such as Ms. Smith, a Wisconsin voter born in Missouri in 1916
without a birth certificate, the courts also need to understand the full extent of the problem the
state seeks to combat with the statute.804 For future as-applied challenges, it is incumbent upon
courts to seek evidence-based justification for these important state interests, such as voter fraud,

797

Persily, supra note 101, at 96.
Crawford, 553. U.S. at 192-97.
799
Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d 627 (S.D. Texas 2014) and Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506
F.Supp.2d 598 (D.N.M. 2007), rev’d sub nom, The Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313
(10th Cir. 2008).
800
Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F.Supp.2d at 637.
801
Persily, supra note 101, at 96.
802
Id.
803
Id. at 97-98.
804
One Wisconsin Institute v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d at 901.
798

100

and explanations for not accepting various forms of ID for many of the reasons stated by
Professor Rubin, such as smoking out illegitimate purposes, stereotypes, and biases.805
If courts fail to properly balance burdens on voting rights and specific state issues, such
as voter fraud, then literature suggests a myriad of legislative options. The first group of
suggestions does not replace voter ID laws, but instead provide supplemental provisions to
enhance voter access, which some states have adopted.806 First, states could provide a free stateissued photo ID option as Indiana does.807 Second, states could distribute photo IDs using
mobile buses to visit isolated rural areas and low socioeconomic areas, as Alabama does.808
Third, states may hold provisional ballots for a few days following an election until a voter
returns with a photo ID, as Wisconsin and Georgia do.809 Most expansively, states can follow
fourteen states that allow Election Day registration and immediately let the newly registered
person vote.810
Literature also suggests alternatives for voters who lack photo ID when the cost of
obtaining supportive documentation may be cost-prohibitive.811 First, states should provide and
accept free non-photo voter ID cards, as Oklahoma does.812 Second, if a voter lacks acceptable
ID, the state could allow the voter to cast a provisional ballot and verify their identity using
signature matching, as Florida and Washington do.813 Similarly, states could require voters to
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complete an affidavit affirming their identity before casting a provisional ballot, as Delaware and
Idaho do.814
More practically, states should mandate a potential voter present photo identification at
registration to verify identity and eligibility, instead of when voters reach the polls.815 Given
rapid technological advances, a voter registrar could take a photo of each voter during
registration and cross-reference photo database from the state’s motor vehicle office to create a
digital picture polling book for precinct workers to quickly verify a voter’s identity, when voters
have images in the state’s motor vehicle office databases.816 In the near future, debate regarding
privacy concerns will likely arise surrounding the possibility of creating a biometric or
thumbprint voter verification databases.817
In addition, literature recommends that states implement better election administration
practices.818 Following the federal Help America Vote Act mandate, states already should have
statewide voter registration databases.819 Now, states should pass mandates for voter registrars to
coordinate with other agencies to ensure removal of voters who die, move, or receive felony
convictions.820 By regularly updating voter rolls, states will also be able to regularly collect data
on voter fraud issues to re-evaluate the effectiveness of voter ID laws.821 Finally, antifraud
legislation should also focus on government officials, especially partisan ones, who administer
elections and have more opportunity than voters to determine election outcomes.822
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Finally, a nationwide photo ID requirement could be the most streamlined option, if
properly implemented.823 First, a nationwide ID law would provide an effective solution to
concerns about voter fraud, both real and imagined.824 Second, one consolidated law would
eliminate confusion among voters and elections officials about acceptable forms of ID.825
Regardless of any reforms adopted, states should still engage in active voter education
campaigns to educate the public about the acceptable forms of ID required to cast a ballot.
Although the Santillanes district court ruling predates Crawford, the New Mexico district court
in Santillanes found the city’s lack of educational efforts regarding the ID law imposed a
significant burden on voting rights.826 The Tenth Circuit, however, after Crawford, noted that an
ID law could not be struck down based on lack of educational efforts alone.827 In post-Crawford
case law, the Georgia Supreme Court in Perdue stated that voter education campaigns mitigated
any burden of voter ID laws on voting rights.828 Thus, even if a law cannot be struck down for
lack of voter education, states may still benefit in the Burdick balancing test if voter education is
part of the statutory rollout.
This thesis found few cases where courts found that voting implicated First Amendment
freedom of expression rights, except for two opinions discussing an inherent “First Amendment
interest” coupled with the franchise, described as the right to be among one’s fellow citizens at
the polling precinct and to openly participate in democracy.829 More commonly, courts applied
the Burdick balancing test when assessing ID laws and upheld most laws showing deference to

823

Developments in the Law: Voting and Democracy Source, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1154 (2006).
Id.
825
Id.
826
Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 635-36.
827
The Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d at 1322.
828
Democratic Party of Georgia v. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 729
829
Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 642 and Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v.
Perdue, 288 Ga. at 733 (Benham, R., dissenting).
824

103

the states’ interest in preventing voter fraud and protecting election integrity. From these cases,
plaintiffs should provide courts with a wealth of evidence to demonstrate the burden of the ID
law on voting rights, including the state’s history of discrimination, legislative history, actual
testimony from disenfranchised voters, and actual costs to obtain supporting documents.
Also, for courts to properly balance interests, the Burdick test mandates states prove the
important state interests addressed by the voter ID law. Without such, courts are unable to apply
the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. Literature suggests that even with 34 states having
voter ID laws, the public perception of voter fraud is unwavering. Likewise, courts cannot
address the effectiveness of these laws without complete information about the problem.
The cases analyzed for this thesis indicated that plaintiffs have a greater chance of
receiving strict scrutiny analysis from a court if the state constitution explicitly provides for a
fundamental right to vote. Literature suggests that even if courts applied strict scrutiny in all
election law cases, the holdings in most cases would be the same.
Strict scrutiny analysis places the burden of proof on the government to show two things:
a compelling state interest and how the law is narrowly tailored to meet this interest. While
Crawford acknowledged voter fraud and election integrity as important state interests, the
compelling state interest prong mandates proof of how the law addresses these interests. Then
courts have required states to engage in good-faith consideration of alternative forms of ID and
give justifications for deeming certain forms of ID as unacceptable under the narrowly tailored
prong of the analysis.
This research area could benefit from future quantitative research studies to generalize
the minimal level of proof courts accept to show significant burdens on voting. More analysis
could also focus upon state constitutional challenges, possibly on a longer-timescale starting

104

before Crawford in 2008 to examine the impact of the ruling on how courts examine ID laws
against state constitutional provisions. Finally, a study could examine the analytical framework
courts utilize when examining laws regarding ballot-access for political candidates and compare
this analysis with voting-access cases.
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